

THE  
CATHOLIC FREETHINKER.

THE ONLY PUBLICATION IN WHICH CATHOLIC INTERESTS ARE  
MAINTAINED FRANKLY ON THEIR NATURAL BASIS OF  
*CHRISTIAN RIGHT*, INSTEAD OF THE USUALLY ADOPTED  
ONE OF ATHEISTIC SUFFERANCE.

No. II.

The Art of Christian Warfare with Wrong.

BY

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TRACEABLE TO THE ABSENCE IN THE CATHOLIC BODY  
OF POLITICAL CHASTITY.

LAW OF POLITICAL CHASTITY FOR CATHOLIC ISRAEL IN  
SCRIPTURE TERMS (Deut. xxxiii. 28, etc.) :

‘ Israel shall dwell *securely, apart.*’

THE SUFFICIENCY OF POLITICAL CHASTITY FOR THE  
CHURCH’S WELL-BEING :

‘ His fountain shall be upon a land of corn and wine. Happy art thou, O Israel! Who is like thee? A people sheltered by Jehovah, the shield of thy help, Who is the sword of thy prowess.’ See also Ps. xxxii. 12—20.

The leakage a fact.—The doctrine of self-possession for Catholics in worldly life, political and ordinary, which this little treatise insists on as its principal point, is one which may be profitable for the consideration of those, who are now anxiously thinking about the ‘leakage of the Church,’ which is no doubt quite enough to awaken anxieties. The Catholic population has been long, and is now suffering a drain in its various classes. Amongst the poor want of care has allowed many to become a prey to artful sectarians, or to fall away into faithlessness. In the better classes how many are falling under the un-

checked attractions of Atheism! In all there are plenty, who have yielded to the tainting influence of mixed marriages.

**Insufficiency of proposed remedies.**—This drain is not to be stopped by any of the methods which different parties have proposed. Of which one of the best, and certainly in itself a good suggestion, is that of having selected preachers to give addresses to the various congregations. One would, however, like to know, what special points, besides the ordinary points of the Faith, they would be directed to insist on, by way of stopping the apostasies that are taking place by the action of mock science, and negligence, and the influence upon all of increasing infidelity in the surrounding English population. Another suggestion, (of rather a trifling character) is, short Masses instead of lengthy ones, as at High Mass. We are not made aware, that Catholics, who attend High Mass, are the sort of Catholics, who fall away into Protestantism and infidelity. A third suggestion, which does not show much insight into our misfortunes, is to alter the Catechism, but the alteration is not in the particular, in which it really calls for amendment. Which would be, if at all, especially in the treatment of the question, ‘Why is the Church Catholic?’ This ought to be answered, ‘Because it is *meant for all*,’ whether all use it or not, or however few. Instead of that, the answer given leaves the learner to suppose that its Catholicity depends upon its actually existing in all ages, and ‘teaching all nations,’ which is not clearly indisputable. Its being the ‘Ark of Salvation for all’ which is nearest to the exact reason, is put last in the answer, as a rider to the two others. But the partial alteration, which this requires, does not seem to have been advised.



**The true cause of drain the want of self-conducting spirit in Catholics.**—None of these advised remedies, would heal the waste, from which our Catholic population is suffering. This is owing to a cause, which the advisers evidently little suspect. And that is, that the Catholic body, being under no better public guidance than their newspapers, does not present to its own members, or to the outside world, anything that would naturally command respect from men. It wears upon itself the most undignified weakness, of not daring to take its own business into its own hands: instead of which its members have been content to sink themselves into association with unknown multitudes, whom they are powerless to influence for their own purposes. They never appear in public life as speaking for themselves in their own name but hiding themselves under the misrepresenting names of alien associations, who have the most unqualified contempt for them. As long as there shall be manifested no greater spirit of self-respect, in the more responsible members of the Catholic body, so long must there be the impotence to retain the allegiance of its members. Who can be surprised that men, whether poor or rich, should desert a body of people, who scandalize their fellow-members, by speaking and acting as if they were ashamed to own themselves to be what they are? As they indeed do, when they disclaim for themselves any right to stand independently as a body among their fellow-creatures, upon the contemptible pretext, that they are too few and too weak to act like men. Such is the conduct, which they are content to follow under the depressing influence of our Catholic newspapers; managed by a class of flat-minded people, who have never learnt to apply for themselves the common-sense rule, that people's success in the

world depends upon their presuming a self-sufficiency in themselves for their own business—in other words, ‘If you want your business done, you must do it yourself. If you don’t take care of your own affairs, nobody else will.’ Just the contrary of this is the counsel of our knowing men of the newspapers, who would make you believe the only policy possible for Catholics is, to avoid by all means, aspiring to the dignity of a corporate body ; that, if they would have any of their rights safeguarded, they must behave as if they had no such right. Instead of taking care of it themselves by persevering assertion of it, they must fling the thought of it away from themselves to the mercy of a mindless mass of parties, who are adversaries to the right. Because, as they always say, we are too few, too weak, to look after our own rights. We must look for their protection to the opponents of the rights, because they are many and strong. If on the other hand, any sentiment of manly self-reliance should venture to show its head, it is immediately put down by taunts and slang in leading articles and speeches from the journalistic deadweight ; which encourages only the sentiment, that Catholics should live entirely on sufferance from their Protestant adversaries. With such servile self-abdication of all corporate dignity, persistently inculcated by our journalistic guides, the Catholic community could not hope to enjoy the advantage of a lead in public life, nor even of such an independent standing, as would command respect from others, or their own members.

This is quite sufficient to explain why it is, that so many, under slight temptations, are found leaving the Church. They see in it nothing to stick to, but its Divine Faith, which its own professors seem to think, must look

for its worldly credit,—not to themselves, who hold it, but to those who hate it. The Catholic body is taught by its journals to disclaim for itself the right to stand in the world as a living society under its own name. How can it expect that its children in the world should find in it more life to hold them than it does itself? They fall from its body, because it does not show them sufficient of its soul to hold them.

But loss of numbers is not the only consequence of this self-abandonment to surrounding influences. It acts further upon those who remain, by weakening their force in all walks of life where they might else be eminent. Some few of the educated portion of our people might be seen at the head of those human studies, which look to them as their natural guardians; as Biblical Criticism, International Law, which is a high department of Casuistry, Political Philosophy, or Justice and Natural Science, or the doctrine of the Works of God, a part of Theology. Instead of that, we find them not only without a lead in such pursuits, or a wish to have one, but without any independent standing of their own. They own no corporate existence, no flag, no opinion of their own on public matters; but what they would have is common to the most worldly politicians. The only thing they are taught to consider prudent is the easy one of sinking themselves lifelessly and unresistingly into the obliterating mass of anti-christian associations. Which they try to excuse by affecting to think—what they know to be untrue—that self-effacement in infidel and Protestant company is a far-sighted policy. What else could happen from such a servile temper, but what we see *does* happen? Loss of numbers and abatement of all public spirit in those who are left. This is not from



want of natural ability in Catholics: who excel in all the quieter arts of life, but from the baneful influence of our anonymous press, who, actuated by a shallow worldly spirit, have always endeavoured to overbear and sneer down whatever could tend to raise the Church in England to the dignity of a body it would be honourable to belong to—*i.e.*, a self-sufficient community, with a name of its own, a policy, a mind, and a spokesman.

This independent character of a corporate body, which every other group of men in the country assumes for itself, is one, which it would require a finer spirit showing itself in some section of the Catholic body, in advance of the majority. That small section has not yet dared, owing to newspaper tyranny, to make its appearance. And if it did, our *Tablet* and the others would soon come out to hoot it down. Nevertheless, neglected as the value of an honourable standing is for the Church, it is its creditable character by which alone its members can be well retained within its pale; but as that creditable character has not yet been presented to them, we ought not to feel surprised that so many should fall away from it. This is the drain, which our writers are lamenting. But as the methods they suggest do not tend to renovate in English Catholics the consciousness of corporate dignity, from the lack of which the retaining power suffers, they will not do anything towards stopping the leakage for which they are intended.

The requisite for checking the defections, being the spirit of political chastity, after Christ's example.—What is required for stopping the drain of our Catholic population is—what it is very difficult to get worldly people to learn—the presence of something of a far higher order than that, which the suggested methods

hint at—an entirely new spirit infused into some leading individual of the Catholic community, consisting of that, which was exemplified by the Master and Model of all political leaders, the Founder of the Divine Corporation, called the Church. In Him the spirit was that of *political chastity*, consisting of a determination to keep the conduct of His great public cause of a heavenly Kingdom, under His own authority, pure from all adulterating alliances, made with others on their terms. To this policy of self-possessed dignity He was ever faithful, in spite of the solicitations, which would of course be offered to Him by some of His worldly-wise followers. Who, like the people that nowadays contribute their counsels in our newspapers, would advise Him, in order to save Himself from being isolated and separated from the national life, to tack Himself on to some or other of the promiscuous associations at that time occupying the political world. The arguments they might urge might perhaps be after the following strain : ‘Your position, O Master, as prophet of the Kingdom of Heaven, is at present quite out of harmony with the spirit of the age. Very noble, no doubt, but—as practical minds, like ours, see—the white flag of the Kingdom of Heaven, in the fashion in which you hold it up, attracts none of the great parties of the world—unless it be to displeasure or scorn. It is neither Roman nor Jewish, nor midway between the two. You are therefore owned neither by Roman Procurator, nor Jewish High Priest, nor Sanhedrim. Neither priest nor layman finds anything of his own in you. Why not then, like a practical man, take up with some of these great influential bodies now in fashion ? There are plenty of them to choose from, without lack of variety to suit every



taste. There is the liberal Herodian, the sober-minded Sadducee, the conservative Pharisee. Some of these surely would be willing to give you a helping-hand in your high design. But then, in order to bring them round to your view of the Kingdom of God, you will have to drop your white flag, which, if you obstinately cling to, you will only make yourself impossible in practical politics. But, if you humoured them a little in this trifling matter, you might make some profit out of them; they might even think of making you king. If, however, you feel loth to give up the white flag altogether, there is another plan we might suggest, which is to cross it with the other flags of Herod, or Rome. A mixture of conflicting banners, flags, and symbols, all on the same level, is a genial show, that tends to conciliate everybody. If also we may venture to go so far, you would be well advised to give up some of your more extreme opinions.—such as, for instance, the resurrection of the dead. The Sadducees don't like that. And the honest Pharisees find you a little too starch in insisting so much upon interior virtue; and in reflecting upon their liking the uppermost rooms, the chief seats, and greetings in the market place, and then is it not pushing the white flag a step too far, to address a class of highly respectable men as a 'generation of vipers, not to be saved from damnation,' as 'whited sepulchres, full of dead men's bones and all uncleanness?' That candid style of language is surely not the one to use if you wish to convert them to your views of the Kingdom of Heaven. It repels, not invites. Many of your cherished opinions would have to be very much modified, or even given up, if you wish to conciliate. To do this you will have to show yourself a many-sided man, with a different face presented to the

different political schools of thought around you. Be all things to all men. And then, it would be wise to advise your disciples to mingle themselves freely amongst all parties—Herodians, Pharisees, Sadducees, Romans. Let the world see that the view your disciples hold of a Messiah, is quite compatible with the widest and most liberal interpretation, and that they hold out the right hand of fellowship to all without sectarian distinction.

Such tempting pleas, which we may be sure were not wanting from the knowing practical men of that time, coming, as He would know they did, from the Spirit of lies, did not prevail with Him to swerve from the high principle of political chastity, which was therefore never violated in His dealings with the powers and persons of His own day; with whom He could have no alliance except on such terms as left Him honourably free to conduct His own cause, according to the determinations of His own mind—a standard requisite for the guidance of those, who, after Him, are engaged in carrying out His cause, which the Pope's prayer after Mass describes as 'the conversion of sinners, the liberty and exaltation of our Holy Mother the Church,' in which is included the retention of the faithful in the Church's fold. This is a partnership in His Work, which they cannot expect to continue after Him successfully, except by partnership in the principle He acted on—of political chastity in full-faced opposition—such as the counsel of His tempters would have found from Him—to the like counsel offered by the Catholic newspapers and their followers. Who, like our Lord's tempters, would crush all thought of political purity, by openly advising, as they do, the Christian people to continue vigorously the practice of political adulteration, by mixing themselves up indis-

criminate with any anti-Christian crowd they may find at hand, with no other motive than the mere infatuating pleasure of joining in the irrational dissipation of electioneering fuss. 'Sprinkle yourselves,' they say, 'amongst the Anti-Catholic parties you find around you, without caring to think about their political drift. Whatever it is, it is sure to be something English, that should be enough for you.' In other words 'Don't be so bigoted, as to suppose the cause of Christ could prosper if it were kept separate from the cause of Anti-Christ. To think it can stand alone in the land, is but a proud, sulky fancy. If we want the cause of Christ's Church to flourish we must ourselves show a broad-minded spirit, by flinging its interests away generously at his feet, as if you really believed Anti-Christ was your genial friend. It will never do for us as smart men, to encourage visible differences between ourselves and others, as if it were a question between Christ and Belial.' How glad the parties reasoning thus should be, to see the modestly retired place which the Catholic Church occupies in 'Whitaker's Almanack.' Where it takes its place among 300 sects according to rotation by the letter R, between the two fellow denominations, 'Revival Band' and 'Royal Gospel Army.' After the first and before the latter, it enters as 'Roman Catholic.' The broad look of this impartial sorting by initials has nothing to make it out of harmony with the mind of our newspaper counsellors, who are so fond of advising to Catholics, indiscriminate mixtures with Anti-Catholics. 'The liberty and exaltation of our Holy Mother the Church' will never get anything else but disgraceful defeat from the movement of those, who run after their advice. This advice, which is only of a sort that dissolute minds are always so ready to give,



would have to be resisted to the uttermost by anyone,—though standing alone,—who desires to see the Catholic people keep to their Church, as being fatal to the health-preserving principle of political chastity: which, being the condition of political strength, even for individuals, is essential to the Catholic community, if it is ever to assume for itself, under independent leading, the self-determined spirit of a corporate body, by which alone its ordinary members can be held from straggling away from it as their spiritual home.

The principle in the treatise conducive to the checking of defections.—And it is that independent self-determined spirit, so far as a private Catholic may practice it, for which a more regular direction is attempted in this little rudimentary treatise on ‘the Art of Christian Warfare.’ The precepts of which are not simply the unreflecting impulses of loose ‘good intentions,’ from which as much harm as benefit arises, but carefully drawn conclusions from a more exact study of the perilously beset position that Right has to occupy in the world.

By the light of that study, the precepts this treatise aims at giving, are a few precise precautions for a Catholic in directing his conduct in the world in a safe spirit of independence, according to the authorizing example of our Lord Himself. Who, being the Master of wise policy, ever presented an uncompromising front to the whole body of evil, without the dread, which is the bane of growth in the worldly-minded—the dread of being alone or ‘isolated.’ It is only after the lessons, which He Himself gives, that, among the precautions this treatise insists on for a private Catholic maintaining a self-determining independence of mind, are:

- i. To preserve, in dealing with others, a position of *clear*

*disengagement* from the network of alien associations, political and sectarian, separation from which some affect to discredit by calling it 'isolation.'

ii. *To use a thoroughly sceptical treatment of all their pretensions as embodied in their accepted phraseology.*

**Efficacy of courageous leadership for enabling the body to retain its members.**—It is this free handling, which, if always steadily employed by our Lord's followers, would save for them the inestimable privilege of having *a mind of their own* for the management of their own business in public life. Which, whether shown by one, or few, or many, in private or in public, locally or generally, never fails to win for those who use it the due measure of influence. For, notwithstanding the foolish contempt which our ordinary advisers in the Catholic newspapers show to it, the power of mind, being, even in a single person, as it must be, the principle of all strength, is no sooner free to exert itself, than it generates movement amongst men. And when it has once liberated itself from thralldom by daring to act *alone*, without waiting for initiation from an incapable multitude, its energy proceeds to kindle an action in thought and speech, by which some few other minds are assimilated. These, according as they may be converted to its impulse, increase the strength it had already begun in them. In this case, being real adherents, they become an efficient body of helpers to the cause; which, if only nominally such, they would have helped to depress by their heavy apathy. It is by this process of mental action, gradually making its way from a single mind, not from a previous agreement of a mindless many, with their formless 'good intentions' that an able group of men becomes formed. This genuine augmentation of force in numbers comes from the virtue



of having a *a meaning to begin with* : which, definite at first, at least in one man, spreads itself then in a few—and by degrees in many. Who thus become a respectable body, able to hold their own before the world.

And if such a spirit of self-determining mind, present in some one eminent Catholic person, like an O'Connell, were to begin working in the Catholic body in England, the Catholic body would soon become a something, which it was not a discreditable thing to be called by. Its adherents would find in it something worthy to hold them; and they would no longer be, as they are now, ashamed of being known to belong to it. The leakage from the Church, which is now so feelingly complained of, arising naturally from the dispiriting influence of the leading Catholic mind, would be arrested, and even turned the other way. This would be the natural effect of Catholics being taught to have, what their leaders at present teach them to avoid having—a mind of their own for choosing their own way.

**Necessity of disregarding newspaper utterances for guarding an honourable spirit.**—But for helping forwards the healthy movement of political self-determination in the Catholic body—in so far as this has to depend upon the good-will of any *private Catholic*, he must have the moral courage—which so few have—to disregard the low-minded gibes, which our Catholic newspapers and their disciples are always hissing out against the wholesome aspiration for a Catholic party in the political world. Which they, in their self-assumed infallibility, decide to be an impossible chimera. The ground, on which they would justify their contempt, only reveals their incapacity to understand what a Catholic party would be. A Catholic party, like any other party, would consist

really of one—or a few determined leaders, who should be able—not all at once, but by degrees—to draw to themselves the minds of others, through the rare virtue of having a meaning of their own, and knowing what their meaning was. Such an idea never enters the conception of those, who debate the subject in our Catholic newspapers. What they think of when a ‘Catholic party’ is mentioned is a promiscuous multitude of human beings all brought together of themselves, somehow or nohow, without first being taught anything to agree about. This childish conception they show to be the one haunting their minds, in the question they are sure to poke at you, as soon as ‘Catholic Party’ is mentioned—And that is—‘How will you get all Catholics to agree upon a common basis?’ *i.e.* before there is any basis offered. ‘How will you make all pull together?’ Pulling together in order to become a party! As if a party *began* by being able to pull together! Pulling together is on the contrary the act of a party *completed*. They suppose it to be its *beginning*. Agreeing to pull together is the act of men already *educated* up to an opinion. They suppose it to be done by an untrained multitude, without a master-mind shewing them how to pull, or what to pull at. In this they display their utter ignorance of the course that human associations follow. In which, if there is one lesson that experience teaches, it is this:—that no effective concourse of men has ever commenced from a *preceding* unanimity in numbers, agreeing upon any valuable resolution. Unanimity is a *consequence*, not an *antecedent*, to commencing power: which commences first without numbers, from a leader, who has a well formulated thought working in him. The mere untaught multitude have no formed opinion of their own concern-

ing the proper basis to be assumed for their defence in public life, other than the vaguest sentiment, if even so much as that. They could not therefore be brought of themselves to agree in any resolution, except it were a forceless platitude. As we see in the resolutions attempted in promiscuous meetings. Still less could they originate any statesmanlike policy—which is the growth only of a scientific head. This is the reason why a body like the ‘Catholic Union,’ can never be of any service to the cause it professes to maintain. It fancies it can realise the formation of strength by a crude combination of respectable men—strong only, in their inert numbers, and their equally inert worldly position. All they are taught to believe in as a source of self-defending power, is a dead list of names, sprinkled up and down with titles. When they see these names and titles increase, they think their stock of strength is increasing. That the force of a self-determining mind within their body is the true fountain of strength, does not enter into their calculations. For lack of this light they never could have courage to co-operate in any resolution, by which men are efficaciously united together for work in the world. The cause of this failure is the radical ignorance of the truth—obvious though it be—that influence amongst men for good or for evil, must have its origin only in *mind*—not in matter, such as numbers and respectability. And mind in any effective measure, is the rare gift of some individual. In whom, when it has first appeared, it operates upon numbers only *afterwards*, and by slow degrees. Numbers of course *increase* strength, when once begun. But they never begin it. And their aptness for increasing strength once begun, is only as long as they are obedient to the originating impulse, under



which they were induced to combine. But strength never originates in the brute force of numbers. Rather the contrary. They help to smother it. Because at the outset of a movement, the *many* have not any initiating spirit to conform themselves to. Which there must be first to draw them together into co-operation. A party therefore, being the union of individuals, prevailed upon by the force of some one leading mind amongst them, can never arise, as our leaders always suppose it ought to do, *if at all*, from the spontaneous thought of so many hundred head of the human animal, in whom thought had not yet been made to stir. This fancy of the requisite origin for an available Catholic party, has been taken by our advisers as their reason for scoffing at the wish of Catholics ever having a mind of themselves, other than what Protestants should infuse into them. The reason of this is, their not being in the least aware, that the soul of all efficient association among men, is the vigour of a definite meaning spreading over them from some centre within themselves.

In their ignorance of this elementary truth, always urging Catholics to continue the suicidal folly of deserting their own home by deliberately losing themselves in the waste of adverse Protestant parties; for no better reason than that the Protestant parties are big and powerful.

In this slavish propensity to draggle after Protestant and infidel parties, as the way to help themselves against Protestantism and infidelity, our leaders represent in our day those silly people of old Israel, whom Isaiah denounces so strongly for their folly in leaning upon the carnal force of Egypt and its horses and chariots, xxxi. 1, 'Woe to them,' says he, 'that go down to Egypt for help, and stay

on horses and trust in chariots, because they are *many*, and in horsemen because they are *strong*.' 'Many' and 'strong!' words exactly hitting the temptations that move our Catholic leaders now to counsel trustful union with Protestants: which is, as they always allege, because they are '*many*' and we '*few*'—they are '*strong*' and we '*weak*.'

Equally partners are they in the evil the prophet charges against the Israelites in his next words, 'But they look not to the Holy One of Israel, nor seek the Lord.' So the Catholics are taught by their leaders not to believe that God has anything to do with the political position of His own Church in England. And why? From the same thoughtlessness there was in the Israelites. Who did not call to mind, as the prophet says, that the 'Egyptians are men, and not God, and their horses *flesh* and not *spirit*.' What 'horses' and infidel 'Egypt' were to the benighted Israelites, that Protestant combinations and ballot-box performances, are to the poor mindless Catholic politicians, who profess to take in hand the care of the Catholic interest. The result of the Catholic trust in Protestant ballot-boxes is foretold in the prophet's next words, as the outcome of the Israelites' trust in the '*flesh*' of horses and the '*strength* of horsemen.' 'When the Lord shall stretch forth His Hand, both he that helpeth, and he that is holpen shall fall down. And they *all shall fall together*.' A very good description of the result of our Catholic's policy. The God they trust to for protecting the Church, is an infidel Parliament. And their form for invoking him is putting their hands into an infidel ballot-box, not a courageous faith in the power of a self-determining mind: which is the sole spring of all power, whether for



few, or many, for ten or for ten thousand. In excuse for their really infidel conduct in asking the powers of infidelity to take care of God's interests, they say boastfully—as of course the old Israelites would—as 'practical men' and 'men of the world,' we have nothing in our heads so hazy or 'theoretical' as an intelligible idea to go by. It is in this happy freedom from all idea, that they will argue, 'We see at all events as men of common sense, that the Parliamentary system, like old Egypt is, at least, an *existing fact*, that ballot-boxes, like the old horses and chariots, are strong *in the fashion*. That is enough for us. Never mind about their not being 'spirit.' The union of Catholics upon a basis of their own, as if they had any right not derived from Parliament, is a chimerical dream. Instead of wishing for that, let each man of us be careful to bury himself out of sight, in some big mass, or other of the Protestant respectables, no matter which. If he does not hang himself on to some Protestant party, he will be *isolated*. And to be isolated is to be weak. But when once he has fastened himself on to one of their combinations, he will be united with somebody; and to be united with somebody is the security of strength. Union among yourselves, they argue, is to be avoided. Because it is *impossible*; and even if possible, could do no good. Seek for help,—not by joining those few, who have a common interest with you, but by giving yourselves over to those many, who find their interest in keeping you helpless. The union you should aspire to, is not union with yourselves at the cost of separation from aliens, but union with aliens at the cost of disunion with each other. Union with *many* enemies, disunion with *few* friends. This is the reason why we are so earnest in advising you to

scatter yourselves about anyhow in the Protestant parties you may happen to find about you.'

Union and isolation, when advisable and when to be shunned.—In this way of talking they betray their incapacity to understand the ground, on which union is strength, and isolation is weakness. Union is strength, only when it brings together individuals having a *common* interest. When the interests of the parties united are *discordant*, the union is a dead-lock, which only increases the weakness of the weaker party. And more than that—it draws away from the weaker party whatever strength they might otherwise be able to exert. And then again, the appropriating party uses the strength it has drawn away against the party, which has sacrificed itself to it. This is the result of that so-called 'union' with aliens, which our foolish advisers always recommend as a most prudent policy.

Equally perverse is the idea of *isolation*, which they think it clever to decry, as being a condition of weakness on whatever terms. Isolation is weakness only when it separates from something which would, if joined, be *strong for the party joining it*. But when the party joined is strong only *against* those, who join it; isolation from it is not weakness, but the contrary. It is then the indispensable condition for commencing strength. Not indeed that isolation is itself strength from the mere fact of its being isolation. But I say, against the dull-witted pretenders to policy; that isolation from a swamping party, is only separation from a weakening combination. Such isolation is the healthy condition, on which alone the seed of strength, which is the force of mind, can find room to exert itself. And this cannot be, as long as its force is, as our Catholic advisers would have it, locked

up in the strong grip of hostile combinations, keeping it motionless.

Now, the isolation, which our newspapers would scare us from, is the health-beginning isolation, which liberates us from weakening combinations with Protestant and infidel enemies of the faith. And the union they would have us trust to, as an honourable alliance, is—like that of the Israelites with Egypt—a paralyzing union with anybody whatever, if only they are strong enough to keep us fast in their net, without motion of our own. The union they so much admire, is that which the fly has with the spider in the spider's web. The isolation they dread, is that, which the fly has when outside the spider's toils. We are, they argue, not strong, or many enough to prosper with a free footing of our own, or by standing on our own legs. But we are quite many and strong enough to prosper with our footing carried away from under us, by the irresistible current of two or three malevolent parties.

The whole advice, now iterated and inculcated upon us by our journalistic counsellors, comes briefly to this: 'If you want to help yourself out of your weakness, you should do everything that can make you weaker; by neglecting the only means, by which weakness is changed into free power, and free power improved. Avoid, therefore, all attempt at taking a footing of your own, by uniting with your neighbour in any common interest. Instead of that, unite yourselves one by one in some weakening associations with Protestants and infidels, who will condescend to accept your votes in order to use them against your interest. Seek for congenial fellowship with those, who pride themselves in caring nothing about you, except to see you extinguished, by using the power your votes help to give them.



If you want to gain the respect of your neighbours, take particular care to making yourself as thoroughly insignificant as you can, by effacing yourselves in a crowd, who don't openly spurn you, just as long as you don't happen to come within their notice. When they see you have no mind, or meaning of your own, they will condescend to be pleased with you. Your policy is therefore to sacrifice your own opinion if you have any to theirs; to sink the cause of God in the will of the atheists—that of Christ in the will of infidels, the interest of His Church in the spirit of 'no Popery,' Orangeism, and respectable English Pharisaism.

This is, without exaggeration, the drift, when expressed in plain terms, of all that has ever been advised as the dictate of superior practical wisdom, by our *Tablet*, the Reviews, and their like. Could idiocy produce anything worse? The principle, which, on the contrary, it is alone safe for us to adopt, concerning union and isolation, might be briefly stated thus: Union is good with congenials, however *few*; and if there be none, then do not be afraid,—as so many have at first been obliged to do,—to stand alone rather than commit yourself to the mercy of uncongenials. For the same reason, hold disunion with all weakening associations; and that the more strictly, as the associations are themselves more powerful for effacing you.

But this dictate of common reason is something far above the catch of our public advisers; who have no more idea of looking to God, and to 'spirit' for their welfare, than the poor Israelites, whom Isaiah lashes for their cowardice. They would call it all 'theoretical' and 'visionary.' The only sober and practical method for them is to sink one's self in motionless captivity, by

deserting the use of our natural forces, and placing them at the mercy of avowed adversaries. If, then, any private Catholic would seek to contribute his little to the extrication of his Catholic fellows from the swamp of political death, in which the spiritless folly of their press leaders has left them, let him, at whatever cost to his previous habits, cast aside resolutely and without reserve, the whole body of enervating cant, which our Catholic writers indulge in, about union, isolation, and party alliances. Let him set before himself the simple fact, that the union advocated by them, is union of Catholics *against* themselves, with their adversaries, and the only union, they advise Catholics to have with *each other*, is an agreement to abandon all independent effort in their own behalf: while the disunion they decry is that, which liberates from disabling self-subjection to enemies. In direct opposition to this folly, let the upright-minded Catholic keep a wholesome dread of uniting with others on demoralizing terms, and entertain no dread whatever of an isolation, which is only a chaste avoidance of demoralizing companionship. Let him not be afraid for a little space, to occupy the dull position of being *isolated*: where, if he cannot do much at first to cherish the movement of Catholic life, which our press has done so much to blight, he will at least be keeping safe—what the Catholic advisers would never let him have—the first condition their Catholic life requires—freedom from the effect of draining alliances. And that good, however small, is infinitely more than his present Catholic leaders can ever teach him to obtain.



# THE ART OF CHRISTIAN WARFARE WITH WRONG.

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## I. INTRODUCTORY.

THE PRESENT SITUATION OF TRUTH DESCRIBED.

NO ACKNOWLEDGED TRIBUNAL EXISTING IN SOCIETY FOR  
ENSURING FAIR PLAY TO TRUTH IN COMBATING ERROR.

THE aim of this treatise is to contribute some elementary hints in the service of those, who would venture, though only within the domain of their own minds, to engage in the disheartening struggle against the errors of the day. The subject itself—like the art of war—is capable of being treated with scientific precision. But scientific precision, though seen in the distance as attainable, is only in a rudimental state in this effort of mine ; which cannot pretend to completeness even in the naming of the points themselves, which it touches upon. These are too vast in number for the compass of one or two papers. And what advice these papers presume to give, cannot claim to rise above the level of the most rudimentary. Scanty as they are, however, they may happily help some reflecting mind to see more clearly what sort of skill it is, that is required for meeting the endless tricks, which error ever relies upon with such success for working its effects in the understandings of men.

The power of intellectual aggression against its corrupting ways, is as necessary as intellectual cultivation itself, for advancing the interests of truth. But important as the art of contentious argument must be felt to be; there cannot be said to exist in the present day, any more than there has been for centuries past, any such honourable conventions amongst disputants for maintaining fairness of conduct between them, as there are found to be in force for every *other* sort of contention, where men are matched against each other, as in games of skill. Thus, rowing matches have their rules of fair play, which there is an impartial body of spectators feeling a lively interest in seeing observed. They have an umpire, whose decision need seldom be called into requisition. The games of whist and chess have their rules of strictest observance, any violation of which would find itself at once denounced. And if any doubt should arise, there might be found in every town a sufficient authority to arbitrate justly. Even the iniquitous practice of betting for profit, has its articles drawn up in the spirit of equity. The prize-ring, also, was a model of fair-play; the rules of which there would be always plenty to vindicate when infringed.

But for the serious occupation of argumentation in the cause of truth, or of dialectic—that is, reasoning, not in its *meditative*, but its *contentious* exercise—there does not exist the trace of any accepted order for preserving logical equity. Except, perhaps, in the ridiculous forms of obsolete ‘Grand Acts’ at the Universities, there is no such thing extant as logical observances even in name, still less in force. If a lie about facts, or a prevarication in argument is committed by a controversialist, there is no tribunal to which the cause can be referred for settle-

ment, no rules to judge by, no umpire to judge, no jury to give the verdict, no impartial witnesses to support the conscience of the true speaker. Ignorance and misleading representations would be pretty sure to carry away the public to the side *contrary* to justice. Where there is no secure tribunal for equity, wrong must have the upper hand. And so accordingly it fares with the interests of Truth. Represented only by a few minds of the better order, its rights lie captive under the unchecked dominion of Wrong, which has, therefore the largest share in all the departments of human studies, especially the more noble ; as religion, political philosophy, moral philosophy, and physical science. All which—especially the last—serve as masks, under which it may carry on more steadily the work of sapping the fabric of Truth. No region is free from its presence.

# 1. ALL ERRORS ULTIMATELY RESOLVABLE INTO ONE.

i. *That of Negation.*—But however various may be its special manifest departments the power of Error is ever one and the same : as Death itself is one and the same, under whatever infinite variety of disease, infirmity, and accident it may work out its way.

Cognate with death, and also with sin itself, the substance of Error consists in that same evil, which our Lord Himself had to encounter in His career, from the enemies of His Truth—the unchanging *spirit of Negation*, shown in contradiction to His claims—in indifference and brutish unbelief.

It is this tendency of Negation, which, little heeded as it is, is as much the pervading spirit of untruth, as gravitation is of bodily weight, in whatever species it may manifest itself : in heresy, as of Protestantism, infidelity,



atheism, pantheism, rationalism, naturalism, nihilism ; in fact all the depraved opinions that present themselves under such various titles in the vast territory of Liberalism. Differing as they may in name and local aspects, they all resolve themselves, even at the first glance of inquiry, into manifestations of the *one* ever present action of *Negation*. Not the reign of grace and theology alone is the object of its undermining action. It invades every study in the order of natural knowledge and of natural welfare. Whatever has a distinctive character or feature, or indeed any being at all, the power of negation tries to make its own, by levelling it into nothingness, which itself is. And having the insatiable nature of fire, it can never be satisfied, until it has brought down to itself every vestige of dignity of nature, and every privilege of reason, which the Creator has bestowed on man. All that is in man becomes, in due time, the proper object of its work. But lurking, as it does, under species as various as the perfections of nature itself, its one unchanging essence escapes the view of the unpenetrating vulgar, who never see below its exterior diversities the common baneful principle out of which they spring.

ii. *The one Spirit of Negation working unseen by endless Diversity of Agents.*

The disguise of its identity under the multifarious aspects of its departments of operation, is favoured also by an equally multifarious character in its *agents*. Who range in type from the most outrageous assailants of positive Truth, through moderating gradations of ill-disposedness, to the tamest instruments of brute indifference. There are the *leaders* in the warfare, who disport themselves in public about politics, science, or religion—men of a certain amount of acquired knowledge ; such as the

Huxleys, Darwins, Tyndalls, Renans, and a whole band of Materialists; as ignorant as their inferiors, of the subjects, upon which they presume to talk dogmatically, outside their own little range. Following them are the chattering pretenders of the Magazines, Reviews, and Newspapers. Lower down, there is the mass of simpletons, who admire the representative leaders; and also the so-called 'moderate men,' who, with a judicious prudence, say they 'don't go quite so far as they do.' Outside these, there is the vast nameless multitude of ignorant and indifferent beings, who are led wherever they hear most noise. Amongst them all there are many, who could be made just as well instruments of good as of evil, if they only had the light of a true idea given them. Many of them, quite unaware, or heedless of the nature of the cause, to which they are lending themselves—and many such as we are in the habit of calling 'excellent men'—'amiable and accomplished people'—'charming fellows' 'clever educated men,' all, of course, 'quite free from bigotry.' Their simplicity, however, does not make them a bit less efficient servers in the general interest of Negation: which, along with its energetic Apostles, holds these amiable accomplished and unsuspecting people as its ornaments, its instruments and strongholds, to lend to its black cause the appearance, which it cannot afford to be without—of innocence, respectability, and dignity.

This motley mass of humanity—designing malignants, and heedless simpletons, are the outward members, who serve either as generals and officers, or as privates in the great army of Negation. Fellow workers in its cause, they either do not know that they are such, or don't believe it, or don't *wish* to know it. Not always

associated together by any outward bond of profession, every Liberal of them can, at his option, disown any section of his fellow workers in Negation, saying, as the School Board Managers would say of the Russian Nihilist, 'Please don't confound *us* with such people as *that*.' This apparent discordance amongst its fellow agents is far from a disadvantage to Negation: which only acquires from it for its outward body, a really *heterogeneous* appearance, which makes its real intrinsic oneness in malignant action less likely to be suspected.

iii. *Negation allowed by the Guardians of Truth to assume to itself unchallenged all the good titles, to which Truth alone has a right.*

One then, in essence and manifold in presentment, its way of setting about its levelling work is of a piece with the hollowness of its nature. With nothing of its own to stand on, it has to depend for its capital upon what it can *steal* from the Truth, which it seeks to dispossess. It is accordingly Truth's own stolen ornaments, which furnish all the seeming of trustworthiness to its agents, the self-styled Liberals and men of Science, who employ as their recommendations before the world, little else than the magnificent pretensions, belonging to the Truth, they aim at ruining. 'In the use of which they may be likened to a boy playing with his grandmother at the game of 'Beggar my neighbour.' With an obvious sort of artifice he takes all the pictured cards into his own hands, leaving to his grandmother something very small in value to play with. Upon the match turning up in his own favour, he boasts to his friends how he has beaten her so 'that she could not win a single trick.' Whatever success the scientific agents of Ne-



gation boast of, is won by a like sort of artifice. That is, a preoccupation for themselves of all their own opponents' rights and credit. This is one of the first preparations relied upon for their battle by the 'scientific'—the intellectual—the large-minded politicians, the dealers in 'free religion,' as we see in their addresses, their newspapers, articles, and literature in general. Coming forth in their periodicals and yearly congresses, as champions against superstition, ignorance, and oppression, they very quietly, without any leave but their own, assume to themselves, after the manner of the boy, all the showy titles that belong to the side of religion, liberty, enlightenment and culture. In this character they pose as the special friends of Truth, Principle, and Candour, perhaps stanch upholders of the authority of Holy Scripture, or as manly deniers of its claims to belief, as venerators of the ancient Church, or else friends of loyalty, and the right of rebellion, and of course ardent followers of science and nescience, of culture, of history, poetry, and the arts; helpers in progress, believers in a 'bright future,' though not a future state—at least not where there is any punishment for the wicked. In contrast with all these magnificent qualifications, which cost nothing to obtain, the Catholic is left, after the likeness of the boy's grandmother, to sink down to his merited lower place as one incurably illiberal—adverse to the light of science, disloyal, afraid of the light of Scripture, or perhaps bigoted adherents to it, shrinking from criticism, child of darkness and despair, at the very best, in their special witty dialect—not quite so fresh as it was some years ago—as a 'fossil of an extinct species,' who ought to be ashamed to show his face in modern society, with scientific people, who have ascertained that they

have sprung from tadpoles and apes, and with liberal-minded politicians, who have, in their interests of light, purged away the name of God from the legalized hours of useful study for children. It is this vast abyss of separation, that the light-bearing prophet of Negation sets between his splendid self and his despised butt, who stands only on religion and philosophy. And it is to this, that he has ever trusted for gaining his welcome with the listening assemblies of the brainless world.

The Truth-holding Christian has but too often acquiesced, though only interiorly, with chagrin, in all these assumed airs of superiority. And in doing so, whether mentally, or professedly, he has only helped to confirm the empty braggart of Negation in a double advantage he has taken—that of creditable titles taken for *himself*, and the same titles taken away from his victim. This is a damage, which no conduct afterwards in the victim, even if he should have the spirit to show it, can avail to retrieve. The consequence of this weakness is that his adversary is enabled all the easier to proceed in his invasion against his rights.

iv. *The Summons made by the Goblin of Negation to the Guardians of Truth to render to itself an account of their own beliefs. Which the friends of Truth in general obediently do.*

Which he does, by a challenge issued to all who dare to pretend, that they can be certain of anything whatever, whether in fact or principle. Such assumption in any region of thought, religion, history, or philosophy, is of itself a deadly offence against the sacred rights of the dealer in unlimited Negation. Who, as the liberator of mankind from the chains of all the indubitable, would allow no sentiment to hold a higher place in the

scale of certainty, than as something *doubtful*, very questionable, what you must allow has been at least disputed, or what nobody ever proved—a monkish legend, a mediæval tradition, or pious forgery—a scholastic subtlety. Anything more fixed than this would be an intolerance intolerable to the free spirit of universal Negation. Who, as it tells us, can therefore no longer, in this age of advancing light, extend its generous forbearance to the unauthorized ideas, which men have hitherto indulged in so commonly, as belief in their senses and eyesight—what they fondly call their soul, their reason, their free-will, their identity, their assurance of existence, their memory of what they saw or heard, their possession of an immaterial something they call *mind*, their experience of an external world ; their proneness to talk about cause and effect, their belief in Scripture and its infallibility, in Revelation and its infallibility, their Church and Pope and their infallibility, their Redeemer and their God. These unauthorized persuasions—held as they have been perhaps by men otherwise reasonable—must now, they say, be made to surrender themselves for judgment to the great spirit, whose daystar is increasing in its brightness—the spirit of Negation. Who, with the tacit allowance of the friends of Truth, has got himself established as the authorized inquisitor in general of all positive opinion. Clothed, then, in the credit of all the superior virtues, which the believing world has habitually accorded to him, the great goblin of Negation—standing forth as the legitimate liberator of the human mind from all infallibility—proceeds to his work of vindicating the sacred rights of uncertainty, doubt, and denial, against the pretenders to any indubitable truth, by issuing a summons to all



believers, through the mouths of his priests and ministers. These are the anti-Vatican statesmen, Church-hating writers in newspapers, religious and non-religious; the sensational professors of science and nescience, who display their proportions in the printed organs or the yearly congresses of know-nothingism; all the worshippers of monkeys, dirt, and almighty nothingness. These and the like are his mouthpieces, to whom each in his adopted department of industry, the great champion of Negation intrusts the uttering of his regenerating mandate, saying, 'In the interests of human liberty, conscience, enlightenment, science, and loyalty, it is now high time to call to a strict account all the childish and soul-oppressing belief in certainty, which the world has hitherto accepted; as the certainty of our existence, or the existence of any cause of it. Those, who would continue to entertain such persuasions must, in pain of being pronounced afraid to face the light of day, present themselves forthwith to our grand tribunal, and there submit whatever pleas they have of certainty, for inspection to our ministers—the illustrious professors of Agnosticism, or enlightened know-nothingism, which is Science. They, as the priests of "the religion of the future," will decide whether they should be any longer tolerated in holding them.'

In making the summons to the world the goblin is too wise to undertake the burden of showing to his subjects—the friends of certainty—where he gets his authority for making it. And they, on the other hand, frightened into submission, do not dare to think he is at all bound to do so. The whole burden of proof is thus thrown by him on the holders of certainty—and they unhesitatingly accept it. With this unchallenged licence

accorded to pursue them with his attacks, without himself being ever pursued in return, it is, that his proclamation is made.

The authoritative mandate, which his Agnostic ministers are now always conveying to the world, is immediately and unquestionably complied with by the Christian believers in Truth and certainty, out of their habitual unconcern for their own position in logical equity. For the rights of logical equity now seem to have been completely trodden out of the minds of the timid friends of Truth by dint of the persevering action of their lordly Agnostic and liberal enemies: who have never ceased to inculcate in practice upon the holders of Truth, the belief that they have no rights at all in argument, except what they may hold at their will—and that is none at all. The friends of Truth have at last become so accustomed to the situation, that the idea of having a right as combatants on equal terms is to them a forgotten thing. All the ambition that now remains to them is to appear *gentlemanly*, and to treat their liberal and Agnostic assailants, as they insist they must, as ‘gentlemen and scholars.’

Led by this supposed gentlemanly spirit, the friend of Truth readily imagines, that he must take upon his own shoulders all the *onus probandi*, or burden of proof, for his own position, without insisting on anything of the sort from his accusers. Accordingly, at the summons made by the goblin, a number of gentlemen of ability, education, and piety in every walk of learning come forth to proffer most respectfully, as to ‘gentlemen and scholars,’ in well-arranged treatises and articles of calm discussion, their justifying reasons for holding by what the goblin has challenged them to prove—their own

eyesight and senses, their reason, their conscience, their Scripture, their Church, their Saviour, their God. In excuse for these persuasions, they hope that the goblin's loyal, scriptural, and scientific majesty will not find them so unreasonable as they might at first appear. Believing, as they confess they do, that the world had a first cause, they nevertheless have not denied that the earth turns round the sun. Though they believe that God made His Church a trustworthy guide—they have no bad intentions against their neighbours. If they have been taught that He would not allow the Head of the Church to mislead them, they humbly conceive that their religion is not therefore, as has been alleged, 'a menace against the State.' Taking the Church as a rule of faith, they nevertheless hope to prove to his equitable mind, that that means no disrespect to the Scripture; and though they still cling to the Scripture, they beg to assure him that they have no settled aversion to natural knowledge. Though they accept miracles, they do not deny that nature has its constant laws. It is true, they hold the unfashionable idea that there are such things as abiding principles of morality; yet, may it not be said in excuse, that many in the world before have entertained the same sentiment without being discredited as dangerous members of society. Even though they highly esteem the privilege of belonging to God's Church, they venture to hope, that their future conduct will prove to the unbelieving fellow-countrymen, who—no doubt quite sincerely—take a different view, that they will be found not quite unworthy of being admitted to take part with them in the interests of their common country. In support of all this, they bring forth before him all the proofs that their research, theological and philosophical, can command.



This self-abasing renunciation of their right in equity on the part of the children of God's Truth before its defiant enemies, is all that the goblin of Negation wants for the present. He has succeeded in making the trembling Truth-holder look half ashamed of himself before the world. This is all he has got for his obsequious reply to the goblin's mandate. Meant, as it may be, for an efficient self-defence, or a charming act of *conciliation*, it acts as a further submission of the honour of Truth, to the impudent usurper's claim. The fact of rendering a reply at his bidding is a tacit acknowledgment that the bidding was rightfully made. By submitting to the assumed jurisdiction of the Devil and his servants, he has subjected his dearest treasures of reason to their scorn, as pearls thrown to swine. In the spirit of scorn these take their careful expositions only as fresh matter provided for them to trample on, scatter, laugh at, profane, and turn against him. Such is the unfailing upshot of the conduct, which the gentlemanly trustees of Truth show towards its enemies. Their cautious good behaviour has been all that was required to bring its noble cause into its present ashamed condition. If Truth is now reduced from its own honourable position to skulk about the world as a notorious offender against human society, it has to thank its prudent friends, its peace-loving officers, its genteel soldiers, for pouring out in sacrifice to the Devil and his ministers, in conciliatory tones, their apologetic appeals, their calm reasonings, their temperate representations, their courteous conferences; which should have been reserved for appreciating seekers of Truth to be brought forth on appropriate occasions. Their conscientious labour in exculpating themselves for believing in their own convictions, which

they ought rather to have indicted the enemies for gain-saying, has only opened a new opportunity to the usurping adversary to prosecute further his successful aggression against the Truth-holder. Which he does by employing against him all sorts of undermining artifices of language.

v. *One of the Methods by which the Spirit of Negation proceeds, being The Devil's See-saw, fixed on the word 'or,' or some falsely assumed antagonism between agreeing ideas. Which the Guardians of Truth usually accept.*

Prominent among these is the *Devil's see-saw*, a trick of language, which has been practised by Protestants against Catholics now for 350 years with almost uniform success, without suffering at the present much abatement in its popularity. The trick is like that, which is so often played off on unsuspecting persons by asking them, 'Which is the proper English, 7 and 5 *are* 13, or 7 and 5 *is* 13?' In this question the attention, being directed especially to the difference between 'are' and 'is,' is diverted from the false postulate of 7 and 5 being equal to 13, which the party asked must swallow whichever side of the dilemma he chooses, if he accepts the distinction expressed in the word 'or.'

Of the same sort of cheat is the favourite Protestant dilemma about Church and Scripture; which, like it, consists in a sort of latent *petitio principii*, or secret begging of the question, by means of a sham dilemma slipped in under the word 'or,' by which the party, for whose discomfiture it is designed, is required, previous to all arguments, without having his leave asked, to allow himself to be disabled from maintaining the opinion he wants to defend. As for example, suppose that opinion be that the Church and Scripture agree. This belief will

be rendered impossible for him to hold, if he has, as the Protestant Negationist always supposes he is bound to do, accepted the question in the form in which his Protestant adversary chooses to set it. Which is a sleight of language, set in words like these, 'Are we to go by Church, *or* by Scripture?' or, 'We have to go by the Church, *or* by the Scripture?'

Now, in this form of words the very terms of the question or proposition, are meant to leave to the Catholic no choice but to drop either one or the other of the two correlative ideas:—either that of the Church, or that of the Scripture, both of which he would like to maintain together. The mode in which this sleight of language cheats him out of his option for affirming both, is not by *asserting* an inherent discord between the Church and the Scripture outright, which might awaken resistance; but, more surely, by quietly *postulating* it in the artifice of a verbal see-saw, cunningly set between them, by insidiously slipping in between them the disjunctive particle 'or.' This little word 'or' put between Church and Scripture has the deadly effect of serving up for the Catholic his Church and his Scripture in the state, not of two agreeing correlatives, or fellow parts of the same divine system, but as two mutually excluding alternatives impossible at the same time; like two buckets in a well, of which one must be down if the other is up. It is in the same position of mutual exclusion, that the Church and the Scripture are made to stand by force of the forbidding word 'or' set between them: which presents them both divided against each other as irreconcilable antagonists. In this situation Scripture is pitted against the Church. And the Church is set in the discreditable position of something, which cannot be taken as an



authority simultaneously with Scripture. If you choose one, you must be supposed to renounce the other. This is just what the Protestant Church-hater wants to make compulsory on the Catholic, in fixing them both as alternatives. He supposes, that one or other of these alternatives must be chosen ; so that if any should choose Church, he is at once deemed to have renounced the Scripture. This has the advantage of setting the Church-hating Protestant in the noble position of vindicator of Scripture against its natural enemy the Church ; and, if he should be supposed to take the side of Scripture, he is obliged to admit himself as defeated of any right to hold by his Church. Whichever way he chooses, or is *supposed* to choose, he is expected to swallow implicitly in the offered dilemma, the condemnation of his own opinion.

And it is in this helpless state, set fast in immovable antithesis by means of the disjunctive ‘or,’ against its own correlative the Scripture, that the Protestant trickster requests the Catholic to recognize the due situation of his divine authority, the Catholic Church.

What, then, must be the controversial fate of the poor Catholic, who accepts the disjoining artifice, which the word ‘or’ is employed to construct ? If he allows it to remain unchallenged, he will have already sold himself into the net of his adversary. In vain will he afterwards plead about possible interpretations and reconciliations. These are but strugglings inside the net. Not having the serpent’s wisdom to see through the cheat, which is being practised upon him in the see-saw expression ‘or,’ he has allowed his whole position to be taken from him in advance. His own cause has been lost beyond retrieve, simply because he has been stupid enough to swallow in

the craftily proposed Protestant alternative, which the word 'or' conveys—a lying disjunction between his own two fellow-witnesses—Scripture and Church, in which the one he is called upon to rescue from destruction is presented to him pierced already to death in the name of its own ally, the Scripture.

And it is in this stabbed condition, that the Catholic, feeling at the same time the presence of foul play—he does not see where—has been content to accept his adversary's form of proposing the question. Instead of repudiating at once *before anything else*, the insulting see-saw, he sets about the useless drudgery of lengthy excuses for his Church as not being contrary to the sense of Scripture. This ends—as it ought to do—in giving to his insolent adversary another fine opportunity of holding his pleadings up to scorn before his own admiring world, as only showing what a tame business the Catholic apologist makes in defending the Romish corruption of the faith. This is the invariable result of contenting one's self with mere self-defence against the artifice, which the Protestant has always been so successfully practising in controversy, in separating Church and Scripture by the word 'or' inserted between them both.

And this perfidious artifice, being performed in the method of a see-saw between the two correlatives, earns for itself the name I have given it, of 'Devil's see-saw.' 'Devil's see-saw' may therefore be reckoned as one of the best artifices that can be used to destroy the integrity of Truth.

The same vicious see-saw, articulated by the word 'or,' will be readily recognised in numerous other examples of sham dilemmas, accepted only too readily by society: as when we are modestly asked to take our choice between

'liberty *or* authority,' 'order *or* progress,' 'Rome *or* antiquity,' 'Rome *or* reason.' Nor could we omit to name the popular scientific catch-phrases about 'reason *or* revelation;' one or the other of which must be sacrificed, as if revelation was not the enlightenment and perfection of reason, 'science *or* faith,' where faith, the highest function of the reason, is made its acknowledged incompatible.

Amongst the false antagonisms instrumented by the word 'or,' is that, which divides knowledge into two separate regions, one which is supposed to be derived *à priori*, and another, which is derived *à posteriori*. There is no knowledge, even the most *immediately* gained, which has not both these two factors in it. You might just as well separate eyesight into two methods, one depending on the eye, and the other depending on the object seen, as separate the knowledge gained by the action of the mind, which is *à priori*, from the sensible fact, which is *à posteriori*. Both are always present in every act of seeing, and so also of every mental cognition. The disjunction of 'induction *or* intuition' is equally vicious. For induction only leads to intuition, and ends in it, when the mediating term falls away after having served its mediating purpose. These belong to the same general vice of setting two correlatives at variance by a disjunctive see-saw fixed between them. And what makes the see-saw between the couples of correlative truths, as nature and grace, successful, is the usual detestable hypocrisy, by which the idea of an eternal antagonism between them is inculcated under a pretended desire to *reconcile* them both, as 'how are we to *reconcile* liberty and authority,' Scripture and Church, science and Scripture, reason and religion? This affectation of a wish



to *reconcile* the two correlatives, only is a more finished way of getting the endless chaotic war between them all the more steadily believed in.

Of these killing disjunctions, so current in modern speech, is the one, which would take away the criminality of crime by presenting it as *either* social or political. If 'political,' it ceases to be anti-social or criminal: as blowing up an emperor in his palace or railway-carriage is not anti-social or criminal, in the eye at least of a foreign government—because the emperor is not merely an individual man, but the political sovereign of the man who aims at him. And that raises the aggression out of the class of crimes. It might even be a virtue. Such is the wonderful effect of turning social and political into see-saw by the little word 'or' set between them.

The like see-saw is effectual for hushing the complaint about a real grievance—like being robbed. This would be allowed to be real and substantial evil to the sufferer, as long as it stands alone, as *only robbery*. But, if the robber add insult, dishonour, and calumny, the whole offence has no longer the credit of being real, according to the principles of modern estimation. It then evaporates into the category of a *sentimental* grievance. So we are taught that the grievance of being deprived of legal existence, as a religious order, is not *practical* or substantial. The grievance is only theoretical.

The same dissolution is worked by other particles; as '*rather than*,' '*but not*:' as when the robbery of all religious societies is smoothly called 'political *rather than* religious,' and letting loose a pack of arbitrary officials against the ritualist clergy, is called a measure '*rather*' of procedure '*than*' of jurisdiction. Religious obligation and religious sentiment are insidiously opposed by

Rénan, when he says in his first lecture, ‘The religion of the early Christians was a *sentiment*, not an *obligation* ;’ as if sentiments of piety and religious obligation could not co-exist in the same mind. The same easy form of contrarious see-saw turns the whole world of truth and welfare into a universal discord. No two virtues, or qualities, can co-exist in peace, according to the habit of the modern Liberal mind. Which finds in any virtue or truth no other use, but that of a lever for turning out some other one of its fellow virtues, or fellow truths, and then being itself pitched out after it, when no longer wanted as an implement for lying with. Some of this dissolving discord will be found planted in every question, proposition, or argument used by the parties of the world outside the Catholic Church ; where alone the idea of unity of Truth can find refuge.

Such are a few of the favourite dissolving and disintegrating practices, which sin uses for spreading discord and mutual antagonism in the harmonious realm of God’s Truth, in order to propagate the Negation, with which it is identified. That the tricks are successful to the last degree, is owing to the unskilful habit of the friends of Truth. These seldom show any of the serpent’s wisdom. With no more suspicion than a fly shows to a net-weaving spider, they fail to notice the quiet trick, by which the poison of discord is slipped in quite unperceived, under some little innocent sounding particle, or else by some assumed unspoken contrast. How lamentable a want of militant economy the Christian soldier shows, when he fails, through customary familiarity with such tricks of speech, to challenge at the very outset, the disjunctions, by which the work is performed ! If he takes them or adopts them, the ‘or,’ the ‘but not,’ the

‘rather than,’ and the other dislocating turns of expression, he is in no less foolish a position than a man unsuspectingly playing with another, who is using loaded dice. As for saying that he and his fellow-disputant are ‘quite sincere,’ it is not much to our comfort. If your house tumbles over your head through the culpable stupidity of the builder, what consolation is it to be told that he was quite ‘sincere’ in making the bad construction? It is the same with the Catholic’s mode of conducting controversy. Of what service will it be to the damaged interests of Truth, to be told that, in accepting the silly presumed incompatibility of reciprocal truths, the parties in the controversy didn’t know, that they were passing current a dissolving compound, by which the whole fabric of truth would be made to crumble to pieces?

vi. *The Devil’s See-saw illustrated from Rénan in his employing the Pretext of devout Christian Faith for banishing Belief in Christ, as well as in God and the Soul.*

Before quitting the demolishing artifice of the Devil’s see-saw, I cannot resist the temptation of presenting another illustration of it from the arch-hypocrite Rénan, of a more subtle mechanism, contrived for the purpose of dissolving our respect for any determinate religious belief as to a soul, its immortality, or a really existing God. In subversion of which, as being only coarse-minded ideas, what is the counterpoise he sets in see-saw against them? It is nothing else than the ethereal charm of a *deep religious devotion*; which stoutly refuses belief to any determinate object at all. The example of this mode of see-saw, which M. Rénan usually adopts, is to be found in a passage of his lecture on M. Aurelius: where, after admonishing us that the



soul and its immortality is something, that Kant has already pronounced to be inherently doubtful, and therefore unfit object for certain affirmation, he proceeds to take up for his standing in opposition to them, the Christian-like ground of an unhesitating devotional trust in what we *can't* see; such as the pious faith, which is said to have been shown by St. Louis: whose belief in the Blessed Sacrament was so firm, as to stand in no need of evidence; the same faith as was commended in our Lord's saying, in His resurrection, 'Blessed are they who have not seen and have believed.' On which words Rénan exclaims, just as if he were trying to recommend faith without sight: 'Charming watchword! eternal symbol of idealism, tender and generous, which has a horror of touching with the hands that which ought to be seen only by the heart. Our good M. Aurelius was on this point,' *i.e.*, seeing with the heart, and unbelieving with mind,—'as in all the rest, centuries in advance,' *i.e.*, in advance of the Christian world, which shows such a brutal liking for something certain to believe in. His 'seeing with the heart' consisted, according to this enlightened Rénan, on the contrary, is not caring a button about such gross metaphysical questions as the soul, its immortality, or God. And the indifference was all owing, we are taught, to his having such an exquisite piety, as could not bear the presence of an object for the intellect, but saw only with the heart. 'Never did he,' continues Rénan, 'dream of putting himself in accord with himself concerning God and the soul.' Whether he has a soul or not is nothing to him, nor whether there be a God or not. He is too spiritual to think of such things. This devout carelessness about God and the soul, which Rénan chooses, for his own purpose, to attri-

bute to M. Aurelius, as something much to be admired, was only the result in him of wonderful spiritual elevation, which was so great, that you must go to a modern German infidel, before you can find a parallel to it. Here are his words: 'As if he had read the "Critique of Practical Reason," *i.e.*, of Kant, 'he saw well, that when the *infinite* is in question—no formula is absolute (though infinite itself, makes part of a formula)—and that, in such kind of matter, one has not any chance of having perceived the truth once in one's life, if one is much contradicted.' What is once 'seen as the truth,' is the idea that, if you can't deny God and the soul outright, you can at all events say you don't want to know anything about them, because the thought of them would only be an intrusion on the sanctity of your spiritual life.

The see-saw between definite religious belief and spiritual piety comes out more avowedly in the next sentence, in which deep moral conviction is alleged as a counterpoising motive for upsetting the thought of a first cause. And the separation of belief in first cause from the sense of moral beauty is made the mark of a lofty soul in M. Aurelius. In Rénan's own words: 'He broke off with a high hand—*il detacha hautement*—moral beauty from all fixed theology. He did not grant to duty to depend upon any metaphysical opinion of the first cause.'

A fresh counterpoise is then added against the existence of a God objectively real, in the allegation of an extraordinary interior sense of another god, who, it appears, is not encumbered with anything so gross as real existence.

'Never,' says this phrasemonger, 'was intimate union with the hidden God,'—*i.e.*, the God of Rénan and M.

Aurelius—‘pushed to more unheard-of tenderness (*delicatisse*) ; *i.e.*, than by detaching duty and sense of moral beauty from a belief in an existing God.

Borrowing the cast of this last sentence, we might say : ‘Never was intimate union with the father of lies pushed to greater extremes of compound hypocritical malice, than in the impudent see-saws of Rénan between religious truth and religious emotion : in which, darkening religion in the shadow of its own name, he would make you believe that true piety, such as his own and M. Aurelius’, is of so sublime a nature, that it cannot tolerate the thought of anything so earthly as being indebted to a first cause for one’s existence. If he is a disciple of the Jew-infidel Spinoza, and of all the tribe of atheists and agnostics, it is only because his soul is too refined to bear the presence of anything rational in the understanding. If he does not care to know anything about a God that exists really *outside* himself, it is only because, like M. Aurelius, he has such a glowing sense of a *non-existing* God, whom he possesses within him. If he does not believe a scrap of any religion, Christian or pagan, it is not owing to unbelief, but, on the contrary, to his transcending excess of faith, which is like that of the Christian St. Louis and of the non-witnessing believers in the Lord’s resurrection, whose hearts believed what they had never seen. The purpose of the see-saw between religion and itself is to plant utter desolation of belief. The plea used for scorning religious faith is the beauty of believing ‘without sight.’ The objects to be discarded from our thought are all the Christian truths. And the motive-power applied against the Christian truths is assumption of intense Christianlike devotion. What blackening of religion cannot be achieved if you only set



the Devil's see-saw quietly at work against it, by appearing against it in the credit of its own great name !

It is sad enough to have to contemplate such elaborate perfidy in a Jewish apostate from Christianity. But one thing still more noteworthy lies in the fact, that all this varnished impiety was published with high honour by the English daily press : in which was not one breath of disgust or indignation to show that the English public had the slightest interest in the honour of the Christian religion, or penetration enough to see through the trick, by which it was pushed aside, in the name of its own teaching. After all, it is only a specimen of a habit which has now become a system.

vii. *Another Method for working out Negation, which the Guardians of Truth accept, consisting in Debasing Phraseology, or Good Words used in a way contrary to their own meaning : illustrated by examples.*

Congenial with the dissolving see-saw, by which the evil spirit of Negation chiefly works its ends, is the tissue of debasing *phraseology*, which it employs for the purpose of mutilating and defiling the features of Truth.

This phraseology is always vicious in one way or other—either from being directly false ; or else, if not false, from being used in the *service* of falsehood : where specious words are offered either in a partial sense, to exclude something better, or in forming some treacherous ambiguity.

Thus, of *good words* made to pass current for bad things, we have 'education' where 'diseducation' should be employed ; as being the right term for instruction deliberately castrated of its better element, in order to cram the learner's mind with odds and ends, called 'national science.'

‘Natural knowledge’ is invidiously used by the ‘scientifics’ as the only knowledge worth cultivating.

‘Secular’ does not stand for ‘honestly secular,’ but for ‘secular’ *only*, exclusive of religion; and thus becomes a lying expression, accepted without challenge by Catholics, where the real thing signified is ‘irreligious,’ or ‘anti-religious.’

‘Progress’ is a verbal disguise for rapid decline from whatever ennobles humanity.

‘Science’ is taken for merely physical, or the science of the sensible, to the exclusion of the science of the *reason* and of the spirit, and their objects the *intelligible*; together with the science of God. ‘Fact’ is a favourite word with most, not because they like ‘facts,’ but because it sounds to them something which they can oppose to the *reason*—to theory and to ‘the abstract.’

So, too, ‘experimental knowledge’ is invidiously thrust forward to exclude philosophy and logic, as if logic was not itself experimental.

‘Culture’ is a plausible pretence for smothering the better aspirations of human nature.

‘Institutions’ does not stand for the planting of beneficent public agencies, but for ‘de-institutions;’ in which liberties are crushed and religious associations are scattered.

‘Law,’ in like manner, stands, not as it should do, for the establishment of abstract justice, or for natural right, but for any atheistic edict against the natural rights of men; which, in order to get fuller freedom for destroying them, are denied to have any existence at all. In this perversion the guardians of right acquiesce.

‘Patriotism’ stands, not for love of country, but for hatred of the Church and all its benefits for men.

‘Civilization’ stands not simply for the bettering of natural life, but for the exclusion of religious culture—legalized adultery and godless education.

‘Tangible facts’ make a pretext for shutting one’s eyes to their significance.

‘Practical.’ But foremost, perhaps, amongst the expressions, hackneyed in the service of fraud, is the famous cant word ‘practical:’ which, ever as it is in the mouths of shufflers, stands not for the virtue of applying the light of reason to our actual circumstances. This, which is its true meaning, is furthest from its accepted use. What it now serves to honour is the refusing place to reason at all, and denying its entrance into the mind. It is thus a very useful mask for irrational, inconsistent, illogical, and unprincipled. Whenever any base thing of this sort is required to be commended the word ‘practical’ is always brought forth for the purpose. That is its real value at present.

Accordingly, ‘taking a *practical* view of things’ is a universally received cover for meanness, selfishness, and brutish contempt of sight.

‘A practical man’ is the never-failing title for one, who is designing to make his escape from some obvious dictate of reason or honour. It may usually be taken as filling the place, where ‘snob’ would be the veracious expression.

As companions with ‘the practical man,’ may be conveniently sorted the three strutting phantoms, ‘statesman,’ ‘statesmanlike,’ and ‘statesmanship,’ which, we observe, are always drawn on to the political stage in leading articles of our newspapers—especially the *Standard*—whenever the writers want to give what they think a robust appearance to public unprincipledness.



On these occasions it makes its appearance as a *virtue*, under the title 'statesmanship.' 'Statesman' is, accordingly, a commending title for a loose public man, who prides himself for his smartness as 'a man of the world,' in regarding public honesty as folly, because it is only 'abstract;' and 'abstract' will not do for 'a knowing man.'

In the interest of shuffling and prevarication, we have the phrases 'extreme opinions,' 'violent language,' 'intemperate,' 'indiscreet.' These are the ordinary epithets for anything upright, straightforward, and intelligible. Whatever is mongrel and debased enters into our modern discourse as 'moderate,' 'wise,' 'temperate,' and 'judicious.'

Then we have other words made instruments of direct lies; to dignify the exact contraries of their real objects, as 'sectarian,' which has now become—with the connivance of Catholics—a phrase for stigmatizing Christian, Catholic and 'unsectarian.'

While 'unsectarian' also, with the connivance of Catholics, is made to yield the rottenness of sectarian and of ultra-sectarian infidelity.

In the same system 'doctrine' is for 'non-doctrine' and 'anti-doctrine;' as 'justification by faith *alone*,' which is only a form of denying anything but a sterile faith, and substituting really unbelief.

'Theory' is taken to dignify anti-theory; as Darwin's trumpery pretence of chance-selection as the cause of natural species instead of creative design.

'Principles' are universally made a name for 'non-principles' or 'anti-principles;' as, 'the principles of the Reformation,' 'of the Revolution,' 'the principles of Liberalism,' etc.

‘Creeds,’ with full acquiescence from Catholics, and even their *adoption*, stands for ‘non-creeds’ or ‘mis-creed;’ as, ‘the creed of the materialist,’ ‘the creed of the atheist,’ consisting in the denial of God.

‘Beliefs’ is the word for ‘unbeliefs’ and ‘religious’ for ‘anti-religious’—fragments of the one religion.

‘Catholic’ has ceased to signify ‘meant for all,’ or for having universal right, or endowed with authority over all. It is now used for the very reverse of all this. What it stands for is *universally devoid* of right—heterogeneous—or that which all have their own authority for despoiling. It is therefore no longer a title for the public depository of the Divine revelation common for all, but for the chaotic aggregate of private likings and dislikings about it—not as being various in its unity, but as heterogeneous in lawlessness; not therefore rightly jealous of the full integrity of its intrusted faith, but bound to be indiscriminate in welcoming every violation of it. ‘A catholic-minded man,’ sometimes called ‘a many-sided man,’ and of course always ‘genial,’ is the name for any loose fellow, who has no principle of his own, and is not opposed to anything, so it be not fast to reason or honour; ready to seem to agree with anyone. It signifies a loose-minded man or a ‘loafer.’

Giving up the Catholic religion is called, even by Catholics who should know better, ‘*changing* one’s religion,’ not renouncing it.

In the same spirit, ‘Protestant Faith’ goes everywhere current, even with Catholics, for the Protestant denial of faith.

‘A robust faith’ is not the faith of one, who believes firmly, or believes much, but of one who believes in little else but what he can see and eat.

'Infidelity' is entitled 'Critical Theology,' and Atheism enters into the English language accredited as 'Negative Theology,' as if it were a co-ordinate department of it, along with moral or dogmatic.

Add to these the class of *pompous emptiness* such as 'modern thought,' 'freethought,' to dignify flippancy and contempt of thought.

'Modern legislation' and 'the principles of modern legislation,' stand as received English amongst Liberals and Conservatives, for turning the English State into an impersonal engine for crushing out human dignity, and interfering with private rights.

'The fundamental principles of modern society,' is a mouthy phrase, which the *Times* is always using, to excuse the English State in its uprooting all the natural and Christian bases of the social order.

In keeping with these phrases the imposing word 'State' is employed principally when a title is wanted to prohibit men from saying their prayers without schismatic intention, taking vows as members of association, or associating together in the service of the Lord, or anything else they have a natural right to do. These things having, according to the Liberal mind, only a tolerated existence, are not to be done without leave of the omnipotent State: which now asserts itself practically, and sometimes even *doctrinally as God*, free from all obligations to morality. Being, as in effect it *claims* to be, the *author* of all natural liberty, it does not own to the duty of being its *protector*, but can destroy it whenever it finds it expedient.

'Forms.' Remark especially the word 'forms.' This should designate properly the rich varieties of worth and being in the world of nature and of man. It is made



to stand now for *deforms*, or *mutilations* of form, as in the accepted phrase 'forms of government' applied to all the frightful *deforms* of government, as Republicanism, Communism, Socialism, Constitutionalism, and other privations of the integrity and beauty of human society. This perversion of the word 'form' for 'deform' belongs to a very vast system, in which we find defects and mutilations are regularly called by the name of what has been allowed to survive the mutilation and deformation. This is well exemplified in the high-sounding titles which schismatics have sometimes chosen for their maimings and mangling of the Ecclesiastical order.

Thus 'Episcopalian' is not used to distinguish Episcopal from non-Episcopal, but from *Papal*, which is itself Episcopal. Though made to stand for the absence of Papal, or for being Popeless, it takes its name, *not* from the *defect*, which really distinguishes it, but from what the defect has *left behind* it, the remnants of Episcopacy. And hence what is called 'the Episcopalian' *form* of Church discipline is simply a headless *deform*, or Popeless mutilate of the Church order.

'Presbyterian,' which really means bishop-hating, in like manner, does not honestly distinguish Presbyterian from non-Presbyterian, but from both Episcopal, which is itself Presbyterian, and from Papal, which is also Presbyterian. It stands therefore as a mask for *two* acts of mutilation, by which the Church would be deprived both of its Pope and its Bishops. But, instead of veraciously distinguishing itself by the frightful negative title of Popeless, Bishopless *deform* of Church order, or by Pope-and-Bishop-hating, which would truly describe it, it invidiously takes a *positive* title, from the Presbyterian element, which its mutilation has left behind, *i.e.*, 'the

Presbyterian form of Government ;' under which flag it sails grandly down the stream of Scotch and English history.

'Congregationalism,' meaning hatred of all ministerial order, after the same law, does not distinguish its object from 'non-congregational,' or from not having congregations, which all have; but stands for the *deform*, remaining after the *three* mutilations, depriving its followers of Pope, of Bishop, and of Presbyter. But the mutilate does not take its name from what it *is*—a headless, Bishopless, Priestless *deform*, but from what it lyingly *pretends to be*, *i.e.*, distinguished from all others by the feature which all have, of having *congregations*.

Every successive mutilation of a whole, or of a previous mutilate, is thus dignified, like the headless monstrosity Republicanism, or king-hating, with the title of 'form,' which ought never to be bestowed except upon that which has a positive character.

Of 'treacherous ambiguities,' the most notable one will suffice. It is that one which has been supinely accepted by Catholics at the hand of cunning Protestant trickery—that is, the respectable sounding adjective, 'denominational,' invented by sectarians for the purpose of deceit, and now applied with corresponding effect to education.

In this comprehensive phrase 'denominational,' Catholics are, with their own consent, politely put under the same indiscriminate title, as that of heretics and Atheists; so that the distinctive character of Catholic is made, as was intended, to deliquesce, like snow in warm water, without observation, into the formless mass of heresy, with which it has contentedly taken a common designation.

We must not forget to add a few of the brief and

expeditious canting phrases, under which desertion of upright principle is sanctified under the name of virtue—as *sincerity*, *charity*, filial obedience, respect for authority for ‘the law of the land,’ conciliation, fraternity, geniality, union peace. All these—properly names of the best virtues—now serve as pretexts, by which the more worthy is invited to merge his worth amongst the worthless—never for the worthless to raise himself to the worthy. They are, therefore, employed as motives for a Catholic’s becoming a heretic ; but find an instance, if you can, of their serving as a motive for a heretic becoming a Catholic.

Here, then, are a few specimens of the way, in which our English language, amongst others, is employed for the purpose of giving currency to deceit, lies, perversions, antagonistic see-saws, decorations of evil, and transpositions of virtue and vice. It is no exaggeration to say, that the whole body of our English language—to go no further than our own—whenever credit, or discredit, appreciation or depreciation has to be signified, has been prostituted into a mechanism of hypocrisy, to the effect of degrading the intellect of those, who use it, and stifling their moral sense. How responsible then are those, especially if they are gifted with intelligence and education, who heedlessly trade in any such of its expressions, in which the interests of Truth are concerned ! In passing current bad language, we are responsible for propagating whatever infection it may embody. For language is the medium of communicating evil, just as much as it is of good, in society. Words when well used are food and light to the understanding. If ill used, they are its poison and darkness. All good and evil, whatever dunces may say to the contrary, follow in the



wake of *words*, especially favourite expressions, watch-words, axiomatic phrases, extemporised political coinages. These supply the repertory of ideas, on which the poor popular intelligence has to feed. The parties, therefore, who have the setting the fashion of phrases, really command society: which turns passively in the direction of fashionable expressions, just as smoke runs in the line of the prevailing wind. It is this subjection of the minds of men to the influence of phrases, however shallow, that is the secret of the success of Liberalism in the world: which has relied on nothing so much as in possessing itself of the resources of language for the purposes of boasting and abusing, dignifying and vilifying. In this it has been wise, because it has instinctively felt that the sway over the mind must come by the medium that conveys thought—the *sham* thought as much as the real. Where, then, this powerful medium is corrupted, as the perpetual use of it to Liberalistic ends has made it to be, the mind also, that daily adopts it unresistingly, is itself made corrupt, and in its turn becomes the channel to others of the same infection it has itself contracted. When, then, the English language, as all modern speech, has been for so long a time the servile tool of falsehood, anti-philosophy and perversion, how can an English friend of Truth escape the blame of fighting along with the enemies of his own professed cause, when he takes into his own mouth without sifting, the established expressions of its pernicious phraseology; such, as we just noted, about ‘forms’ for deforms of Government, ‘forms’ for deforms of Christianity and of religion, ‘creeds’ for non-creeds, ‘institutions’ for deinstitution, ‘law’ for regulated oppression, ‘legality’ for established lawlessness, ‘State’ for the public agent of persecuting all

man's rights, natural and political, 'science' for advance in uncertainty, 'education' for diseducation, 'sectarian' for unsectarian and entire, 'Catholic' for heterogenous and infidel, 'practical statesman,' for public timeserver, and 'statesmanship' for perfidy; with all the other innumerable tricks of English and modern speech, framed to promote the interests of falsehood, not merely to *fact* but more especially as to *principle*. To use its verbal mechanism after the modern Englishman's own way, is only training the understanding in the exercise of prevarication. Those friends of Truth, therefore, who wilfully put on the yoke of its lying phraseology, are only efficiently working as self-made bondslaves in the service of the falsehood that oppresses them. For every perverted expression which touches the interests of Truth, is loaded with a weight of reason, all turned the wrong way: which acts against the Truth-holder, who accepts it, not simply as conclusive in argument, but even as tantamount to the practical defeat of his own cause. Good, therefore, as the cause is, it is forfeited duly by the Truth-holder, according to the right of logical consequence, whenever he has heedlessly resigned himself to the use of the phrases of modern English, as administered by the gibbering masters of our literature, periodical, or otherwise. Their dialect contains a denial of every principle his cause should depend on. In making himself a party to their language, he naturally loses, as he deserves to do, the good cause he would maintain. When, then, the cause of Truth is held captive, as it is by the demon of Negation, the Truth-holder, not being a *Truth-defender*, has no right to complain. The loss is owing only to his own unmanlike stupidity, in adopting with his eyes open, under no other force but his own lifeless will, the use of a

perverted dialect, in which all that he should resist is sanctioned, and all he should hold sacred is renounced.

All-powerful engine as language is, for demoralizing as well as for enlightening, we find, nevertheless, that Catholics, under whose disposal it is, just as much as of their adversaries, have, with a dead listlessness, resigned the working of it wholly into the hands of the various ignorant mischief-makers opposed to them. Where have they been known to contribute the sign of a thought of their own to the public life of the country? What perversion have they been known to correct? They have, on the contrary, accepted all the perversions of language which have been already enumerated, and then employed it in the same demoralizing direction, in which their own adversaries set it for them. In the whole reign of the English political vocabulary could we find the Catholic using any word, but what the Protestant anti-philosophy of Liberalism happens to give him? His political talk is simply that of an English Conservative, or an English Liberal, or some mongrel shade of English. Anything, so it be void of a distinct Catholic character. And if he is asked why he never dares to offer an idea of his own to the age, in which he lives, to help it out of its quagmire of errors, he tells you that this surrender of his thought to the fashion of his misleaders is only his unpretending form of taking a patriotic part in 'the national life of his country,' from which he would not like to separate himself. It is thus that he would dignify his spiritless desertion of his own community, under the pretence of a great public spirit.



2. THE PROSTRATE CONDITION, TO WHICH THE CHRISTIAN TRUTH-HOLDERS HAVE BROUGHT THEMSELVES, BY PASSIVELY ALLOWING THE PARTY OF NEGATION TO HAVE THE LEAD IN FIXING ALL PHRASEOLOGY TO SUIT THEMSELVES.

Taking account of this conduct, we may be better able to bring within our view the relative situation, in which the holders of Christian Truth stand to those of anti-Christian Negation. The situation of the Christian Truth-holder, then, may be likened to that of a man playing chess with another, whom he has habitually allowed to outrage all the rules of the game, in insisting upon taking away his opponent's pieces off the board as he pleased—setting the remainder just as he liked, or obliging him to make the moves that suited himself best. And, in order to forestall him from making any just complaint, he raises a cry that he himself is being dreadfully injured, invaded, and threatened by his encroaching fellow player. Then, under the plea that further restraint is needed against him, he knocks him over, as being an ignorant and violent fellow, always acting in such an indiscreet and intemperate style, that he ought not to be allowed to play at all. If this were the position of the beaten chess-player, it would not be at all worse than that, in which at present the reduced cause of Christian Truth stands in logical equity towards the triumphant negation of it, as represented in the timid Catholic towards the overbearing Protestant,—the Christian apologist towards the scoffing Materialist,—the friend of political justice towards the unprincipled Liberal statesman. This is a degree of humiliation on the Truth-holding

side, which might be thought bad enough. But it does not nearly reach the description of his case. His state is rather like what would have taken place, if the ill-treated chess-player should deem it the height of prudence to manifest *acquiescence* in the condition, to which his previous want of spirit had reduced him, and praise his oppressor as being fully desirous to show fair play.

And this is the case. For hundreds of years—and still more, perhaps, the last fifty years; and now more than ever—the Truth-holder has been so drilled by his empty, bullying adversary into submission to his assumed superiority, that, with some few exceptions, almost all who have not abandoned Truth seem content to hold it at the pleasure of their adversaries. In this contented state they seem to have even forgotten that they have any rights in logical equity at all: which accordingly are now all in the undisturbed possession of the enemy.

The only portion in logical equity which the poor Truth-holder now occupies in front of his victorious enemy, is merely such a vestige of freedom, as would survive after a long and unsparing contest, in which the Truth and its rights had been time after time so dishonourably surrendered, or so weakly defended, that there existed no longer any tribunal for its vindication. And so it is now. There exists no public *authority* in human society, to which the Truth-holder can appeal for rightly conducting the interests of truth or right.

3. THE TRUTH-HOLDER LEFT, IN CONSEQUENCE OF HIS PREVIOUS NEGLECT OF SELF-DEFENCE, WITHOUT ANY APPEAL FOR RIGHT OUTSIDE HIS OWN SELF-VINDICATING POWER, AS HOLDING WITHIN HIS OWN CONSCIENCE THE OFFICES OF PARTY, JUDGE, LAW, AND TRIBUNAL.

If, therefore, he would *defend*, as well as *hold*, his Truth, he must make up his mind to the fact, that he has no other tribunal now for his right against error, but within his own *conscience*.

There are no *rules*, even conventionally acknowledged, for conducting the contest with the agents of Negation. The Truth-defender, therefore, must find in his own conscience all the authority for the *rules*, by which he would maintain it. There exists no *judge* to administer any rules. The Truth-defender, therefore, must be also his own *judge*.

There are no impartial spectators to encourage him with their cheers or effective help. His own conscience also must provide all the encouragement he has to expect. Subdued by the attractions and bullyings of the army of Negation, the friends of Truth are some of them pretty well reconciled to error, or else but tamely opposed to it. And many of those who still stand to the Truth are too prudent to utter a word against its foe. But little help can be expected from them by the Truth-defender, until he can first show them, that he can help himself. His conscience in the meantime must be his only friend.

He must frankly recognize the fact, that the state, into which he has to enter, is a state of *war*: which, as it has generally been carried on only on one side, he must take



now up for himself *on the other*. In this enterprise against an enemy, who will give his cause no quarter, he must be ready to look for trustworthy help to nothing but God and his own conscience.

If, then, he would not be resigned to having his rights in Truth kept from him, even within the narrow compass of his own private mind, he can look for no share in logical equity, but what he can win for himself according to the right of war, by the cunning of his own single hand.

How, then, to secure that portion is a skill, which it therefore concerns him well to possess. The only friends he has to rely on, must be what he afterwards makes himself. Till that he must be prepared to be his own fighting man, his own general, his own army, his own law, his own tribunal, and his own judge.

## II. THE POLICY TO BE PURSUED BY THE GENUINE TRUTH-DEFENDER.

THE BUSINESS INTO WHICH THE TRUTH DEFENDER HAS TO  
ENTER IS THAT OF

### 1.—*A War.*

We have seen from the last chapter, that anyone who would be a *defender* of the Truth, as well as its friend, must frankly recognise, without any attempt at self-deception, the dead fact, that there is being carried on more vigorously than ever against the Truth he holds dear, an exterminating warfare, which can never reach its contenting level, until it has completed its annihilation amongst men, by sinking it all, whether Christian, or natural, in the one abyss of universal Negation. Thither it is, that the enemies of Truth hasten of set purpose; and, after them, are drawn along captive, sooner or later, its Conservative friends; who always tell you they ‘can’t help it. They needs must.’

ii.—*to be undertaken without waiting for animating examples.*

If, in opposition to the irresistible current of anti-truth, the defender of Truth would wish to lend his help towards saving any little portion of its sacred interests, he must at once give up waiting till the many weak friends of Truth have become its champions: which

is not to be expected of them. They have been hitherto as a body unanimously leaning to the enemy conciliation-wise. That is not the disposition, from which they will unanimously turn round, to pull together like brave men, the contrary way against him. To wish it, as so many content themselves with doing, is a mere womanish dream, and a very vain one. Pulling together the right way against the stream of lying Negation, could only be the gradually formed result of an animating example, set by a few—a very few—honest minds, capable of assuming independence. It could never be the spontaneous instinct of the many, however well disposed. Their instinct is not to pull at all, but to be pulled together, like brute matter, whichever way the big multitude that is nearest to them may lean. The encouraging vision therefore of a great enthusiastic party, springing up all of itself without leaders, to move together against the prevailing current of anti-truth, must be put entirely outside the expectations of the friends of Truth.

Neither must he wait to see springing up to his relief a professed Order of select brave-hearted crusaders to undertake the cause of Truth, now left deserted before the attacks of the world. There is no such body of Regulars to take him up into their organization. In the army of Truth very few have the thought of fighting for their cause. The most characteristic function they show of an army, is the business of making a prudent retreat before the enemy, like ‘practical men’ or men of ‘tact.’ Of those, who would undertake the work of defence, some scores may be found who carry shields; but very few who carry swords. And the use of the sword, or of any weapon of offence, is looked upon by most in the camp of Truth, as Quixotic, or out of date in this age. This is the



reason why he, who would do anything in the defence of Truth, must also do it *himself* as a free lance, or volunteer, *single handed*.

iii.—*according to a method adapted for practical effect.*

But, to make his zealous disposition available for good, he must well understand, from what spring it is, that the deciding forces of the battle of Truth and anti-truth really flow. The originating source is not in the region where they show themselves in ultimate effect: as in the walk of literature and education, science, law, Government and politics, Parliamentary business and electioneering.

These are the practical departments of human life, where the force of contest is felt at last. But they *are not the seat* of the vital force itself, from which the stir of battle is fed. The fountain of all the war-waging power in the interests of Truth lies in a more secret part, *outside* the manifest region of the practical, and *above* it. Whatever has not its root in a region *above* the practical will never itself become practical, so as to make its bodily appearance as ripened fruit, in the great market of public life. To have any place there, is the lot of only such things, as have first merited the honour of being present there, by having first passed through the condition of a *private nurture*. in a more abstract region of existence.

(a)—*directed to the mind, which falsehood now occupies*  
—*the true seat of practical power.*

And what is the secret abstract region, in which the virtue of all the practical has its seat? It is the metaphysical region of the minds of men. Whose invisible conceptions are the irresistible cause, that determines the

character of all human practical movements, as a ship's rudder determines the course of a ship. What is done in the metaphysical region of the mind is, has been, and ever will be, sole sovereign over material practice, good or evil.

Whence arise civil disorders—shooting at landlords for possessing their land, withholding rent, and all the practical beginning of civil war. Not from anything already embodied, but from an action as yet metaphysical—resolutions taken within the secret chambers of the mind, disturbed by images coming from the *minds* of others.

Whence arise beneficent institutions, charitable organizations. From the same metaphysical region stirred by the spirit of benevolence.

(b)—*operating by real ideas to supplant the mock ones.*

The practical then is never anything else than the concretion of an *abstract idea*, that the mind has generated invisibly. This, first made audible in word, is then made tangible in thing. In that state it is rightly called the 'practical.' If, then, the practical ever takes its place, it is only because it previously had a vigorous life in the state of metaphysical conception.

Where, then, there is no abstract idea to precede, there can be no practical to follow. Where there is nothing secret and invisible, there will be nothing public and cognizable. Where there has been nothing metaphysical in power, there will be nothing physical in act. In the region lower down than that of mind, we have the world of the physical—things *past*, not future—results already determined—not determining causes. But it is determining causes, not determined results, that we want for *future* practical good: which must have its principles of growth in no other field than the metaphysical part of

men—their *mind*. It is there, that the action of Truth, like that of untruth, must begin in its working for practical edification, as anti-truth does in working for practical mischief.

Whatever public aim therefore in favour of the interests of Truth and Right does not take for its mark the free capacity of the minds of men, leaves untouched the fountain, from which alone any force can issue for efficient action. The public battle of Truth and falsehood is not to be fought according to the misbegotten, blundering notions of your self-styled ‘practical men.’ Superficial, blind, averse to reason, ever aiming outside the mark—at mere consequences, not at vital *causes*, they feebly suppose, that they are doing a good stroke of work for their cause of right, by dabbling about in grounds already preoccupied by opposing wrong, in helping to send members to Parliament, and electioneering work performed inside a ballot-box by a crossed ticket. The ballot-box and all its agencies are wholly in the possession of practical rottenness. Rottenness alone therefore can find a representative there. If, then, anyone not a friend to rottenness, would confine himself to such sort of service in the cause of God’s Truth, as his ticket inside an English ballot-box can work in the English world, he might just as well give up his pretending to fight for the Truth at all.

But yet the ballot-box teaches us one great lesson—in its being a witness to the virtue of metaphysical action. Which it is in this—that the possession of it by its masters, as of all other parliamentary agencies, was gained first of all by their addressing their contemporary generation in its *mind*. Which they did most perseveringly through books, speeches, and popular sayings, aptly



framed for the purpose of unteaching them—*i.e.*, teaching them to think and talk like fools. And if they were taught to do this so effectually for mischief afterwards, it was only because they had been first judiciously touched in that metaphysical quarter, which was the fountain of all their practical—their poor heads.

There, then, in the mind, in the region of independent thought, outside the mechanism of what is called ‘practical politics,’ outside all existing secular institutions, which are at present pre-engaged and retained for the business of snobs and ignobles, lies the true field of action, which must determine what shall afterwards become practical for good.

Without previous and continuous operation of free mind upon mind, all other agencies that the professed friends of Right would employ, however bustling and showy they may appear, are but mere playing in the gutter of human affairs—labour wasted only to waste the heart with disappointment. The invitation to take part in it should be avoided as a mere seduction to self-degradation. If zealous appeal to the minds of men in the ordinary modes, which the devil’s agents employ so well on their side, be neglected, the whole principle of the practical is neglected. And the mode, in which the devil’s agents stir men’s minds is by spreading what looks like doctrine and ideas. This gives us an answer to the question, ‘What is the first requisite for an efficient worker in the interest of Christian Right here in England?’ It is the abiding sense, that practical efficiency for it can come only by direct address to the thought-conceiving minds and consciences of men, as being the one and only spring of all that is to be afterwards embodied in actuality, bad or good. For the sake

of that one fountain of practice, all concern for instituted and now preoccupied fashions of procedure may be, for a season, at least, safely abandoned, as luring only to the shipwreck of all our invaluable ability—that of free mind.

(c)—*in bold Language, matching the boldness of the imposing falsehood.*

Thither, therefore, to the mind, must be the direction of all the Truth-defender's efforts. For the forces, which the Truth-defender has to rely on for doing his small stroke of work in the interests of Religion and Truth, are the same as those of his enemy the Truth-assailer, viz., the forces proper to Truth itself: which are the same on both sides. Whether Truth, or the devil's anti-Truth—each takes its operating influences from one side only—that of Truth. Because Truth alone has any native force for swaying the minds of men. The other side, anti-Truth, has absolutely *none* of its own. All it has therefore to rely on for working on men's minds, is simply what it can keep on pilfering from its opponent Truth, consisting in *semblances* of Truth,—scraps and partial sayings, grand sounds, piteous appeals, airs of nobleness and open-hearted candour, making up a fine stock of lying appearances.

All these assumed representations, made out of the native property of Truth itself, gain their effect on the mind by *seeming* to the vulgar like ideas. For *ideas*, or else their *seemings*, non-ideas, are the form, in which both Truth and anti-Truth take up their place in the mind as its moving impulses. Thus if 'Catholic faith' presents an idea or coherent thought for Truth, anti-Truth has on the other side its non-idea, or an incoherence to imitate

it, of 'Protestant faith;' which sounds to the vulgar ear just as much like an idea, as the idea itself, to which it is set as counterpoise. All these mock ideas, being themselves without vital coherence, contain, nevertheless, in their jumble, some reality for their material, as 'faith,' and 'Protestant;' which give them an attractive or repulsive power, like to that, which the original ideas have, for charming and terrifying the imagination of such as have no discernment of their incoherence. Those who have nothing else but their uninstructed piety to guard them against the delusions of Truth-mocking Negation, will naturally be swayed by them.

If, then, in counteraction to the noxious dominion of mock ideas, the Truth-defender would mean real work against the Truth-destroyer—the Apollyon; let him first turn his back for good and all upon the mob of drivelling dead-weights, who are always calling themselves 'practical men,' and then resolve within himself in fellowship with the wise of every generation, that the only application he can employ for raising a forcible action in the world of men for Truth and Right, is that, by which the usurping mock ideas of the Truth-destroyer are resisted. And the only fund of resisting force is the substance of *genuine* ideas, thrown into the spring of all human practice, the human mind. For as the mind is the organ of all effort for Right, its *ideas* alone are its instigating power.

This brings the Truth-defender practically to the business of taking up for his arms and spear in the service of Truth, not the preoccupied mechanism of the dumb Protestant ballot-box, on which so many Catholics rely as the best organ for defending the Catholic Church in England, but the mind-moving instrument which ballot-boxes cannot touch—free speech, which is the sensible body



that the energy of ideas assumes for its vehicle between man and man. This vehicle has been hitherto allowed to be undisturbedly occupied by the noisy traffickers in Negation: who have got themselves possessed of all the creditable language of Truth for spreading abroad their non-ideas. To what mischievous success may be seen well enough exemplified in the career of the prostituted word 'legality.' This good word 'legality,' like the words 'authorized' and 'unauthorized,' was once used to express a real idea, distinctive of order as against disorder, of authority against rebellion. And in this position it was the mark of attack for the forces of revolutionary disorder. But when these same revolutionary enemies had once climbed up into the seat of the authority, which they had displaced, they then assumed for their own non-ideas all the creditable titles belonging to the ideas, which they had before denounced, as 'obedience' to the 'law of the land,' and 'authority of the *state*.' These, therefore, now, instead of signifying the personal fountain of liberty-preserving law, has come to stand as a title of an *impersonal machine* for crushing out human liberty. Amongst these imposing titles, the pretence of 'law,' or 'legality,' like 'authority,' is now accordingly unceasingly employed by the successful party of disorder more than ever it was before by those whom they scouted for using it. The nest of Atheistic usurpers now in France flourish the phrases 'law' and 'legality' as a whip, with which to flog the poor children of order, in return for their having tamely surrendered their own proper credit into their hands, by way of conciliating them.

In this transposition of creditable words, like 'legality' from the side of Right, to that of its contrary, the side of Right, be it noted, suffers more than a

*double* loss. Its first loss is that of the *credit of legality* for themselves. The second loss is—that what they themselves *lose*, is *added* also as force to their enemies, which is *doubling* their first loss. Then, when the enemy puts their own stolen credit of ‘legality’ into actual play against their bereavement of the same; these stand not merely deprived of their credit as keepers of the law, but are forced to suffer the discredit of *rebels* against it. This brings to their enemy a *third* augmentation of advantage over them in amount of credit; which would in arithmetic be called, not merely *double* the difference, but the *square of the difference* in credit and discredit. And when, furthermore, the worsted party seals this multiplication of their two previous losses by consenting to it, they themselves multiply over again the whole difference in advantage, which they before allowed their enemy to gain over them.

The same self-multiplying force of evil for progress in success is terribly exemplified in England in the misapplication, to which Catholics have given their tacit consent, of the word ‘conscience;’ the credit of which the English Government, of course with national acquiescence, has, in its anti-conscience clause, transferred from the Christian party, who have a right to it, to the anti-Christian, who have no right to it. And these last, now strong in the power of public sanction, enjoy all the honour of conscience undisturbed. Hence arises to the true children of conscience the threefold injury just before described. The first of which is having their own credit of conscience *taken away* from themselves. Which is bad enough. The second is having their first loss *doubled*, in the lost credit *passing over to the advantage* of their infidel adversaries, who assign it all to themselves.

The third injury—worse than the other two—is having the two former losses not merely increased, as by addition, but actually *multiplied* together, to form a product; which happens as soon as ever the adversaries bring, as they do, their own *increase* of credit into active play against the proportional increase of discredit in their victims. The product thus arising becomes equal to the *square of the first difference* in credit: all which has grown out of the first privation.

Thus the injury, which the transfer of credit from the right to the wrong side brings to the losers, is one, which increases against them at every step of its way in a geometrical ratio. Of such sort is the power which the public authority of England has won for the anti-Christian against the Christian by merely transposing the credit of ‘conscience’ from the Christian side to the side of the anti-Christian. What wonder, then, with this advantage, it should have succeeded in fixing a legal stigma against the Name of God in education, as being an ‘undue influence’ against the conscience, by which freeborn Englishmen are oppressed in their sacred rights of dissenting, non-conforming, disbelieving and blaspheming? All this liberty for evil has been achieved through the advantage, which the party of Right have allowed their foes to get over them by stealing from them the native credit of Truth, even though only in the worth of one single word, ‘conscience.’ All this unmatched advantage, which the use of language carries with it, has lapsed from the side of right, to swell the resources of wickedness, which now is able to cover its own naked hideousness in the dress of conscience and virtue that belong to Truth—its stolen vesture, its stolen credit, its stolen majesty and titles. All these the supine trustees of Truth have



fatuously let slip away from themselves into the hands of their rapacious enemies, by leaving the fair and equal field of independent self-assertion to be solely at their command. Those, therefore, left with almost unchecked liberty to strut about the world as the legitimate functionaries of Truth, apply to their own vile ends without intermission all its winning powers of language, its voluble phraseology, its power of popular address, its dignified reproofs, its bracing watchwords, its rousing war-cries, its soul-stirring appeals, and all its shows of reasonableness, which the Divine author of speech meant for swaying the minds of men to good. Its bravery has been all surrendered to the impudent enemy by the cowed friends of Truth. And in their surrender of the administration of language is the real secret of the captivity, which the Catholic populations are at present undergoing under their foes. That captivity is *voluntary*. It has been voluntarily procured, and is now as voluntarily endured by them. They have the absolute power of liberating themselves, and even of *overcoming* the adversaries. They have at their command all that their adversaries have, and more. Why, then, do they not use it? It is because they are suffering a mental captivity under the fascination of overbearing public sin, which blinds them to their own all-sufficient power. They don't know their power; they *won't* know it. And they try to increase their blindness by keeping their eyes fixedly staring at the dazzling world of parties and empty politics. In this worldly engrossment their backs are turned upon the invincible basis of all their own political and social power, which is their position as Israel, the people of God, His nation and kingdom. This is forgotten; and that is the reason why the grand

voice of all-subduing Truth is not heard from them. Lying alone now possesses all their rightful share in the language of Truth, its name, dress, and glory. In that allowed usurpation is the real cause of the present triumph in the world of falsehood over Truth, which the Truth-defender should make it his business to understand.

iv. *In proportion to the employment of which it is, that the success of the battle varies.*

For it is in proportion to the assiduity with which the language proper to Truth is employed—either falsely or truly—whether by its native children or by its usurping enemies, that the issues of the warfare between Truth and Negation have turned to one or the other side. All the *things* of men are in the power of their *words*.

And as the words of Truth and Right have been applied most energetically in these latter days by the usurping party of Negation, while the other party have been losing heart more and more in the work of affirming it; it is no wonder that the party of Negation, which set out with *nothing* of their own, should now seem to possess almost all the honours of Truth; and the friends of Truth, who set out with *all*, now seem to be reduced to almost nothing. Sin with its Protestantism, Republicanism, and Materialism, hold next to undisputed sway; and Truth is ashamed to show its head, or has to be content to crave a little indulgence of liberty under it.

v. *Now, consequently, threatening to end in a Total Transposition of the due places of Truth and anti-Truth.*

The natural consummation, to which this successful encroachment of Falsehood upon Truth tends, would seem to be—that in the close of the world-long struggle between them both, there will have come to pass a

*complete transposition* of the rights of each to the other. Privative Negation, the essence of evil, which at first had *nothing*, will be found possessed of all the might and honour of Truth; while Truth, which at the beginning had all, will be left as an abomination, with nothing but its naked right, covered with all the shame that belongs to desolating Negation.

## 2. THIS WARFARE AGAINST NEGATION REQUIRES, ON THE PART OF THE TRUTH-DEFENDER—

### i. *A zealous struggle in our Lord's cause of Affirmation.*

Such being the description of the enemy, with whom the Truth-defender has to deal, the way of proceeding efficiently against him requires that he should be as 'instant in season and out of season,' 'instant' in pressing forward the interests of his cause of Truth, as the cunning adversary is in pressing forward the cause of anti-Truth; the means of doing which should be as directly opposed to the means used by the others, as the nature of the one is opposed to that of the other. For the nature of anti-Truth, being that of Negation, that of Truth is therefore *affirmation*. As the Negation is unlimited and unmixed, except in so far as it is expedient in practice to seem coloured with something less repulsive; so, on the other hand, *affirmation* is unlimited in its reach. As Negation is always increasing in volume and intensity, so Affirmation should always be seeking to extend its domain in depth and breadth. The spirit of Negation has, after its lying nature, got itself called 'Positivism,' the technical name proper to Truth and certainty. The spirit of Affirmation, which is necessarily positive, is true 'Positivism;' the title of which the



Truth-defenders should vindicate for themselves from its usurpers. As Negation has for its office the 'denying all things,' Affirmation has that of 'believing all things.' As Negation seeks to win its way by making things doubtful, loosening, obscuring, confusing, disintegrating, and always keeping at least *indeterminate*; so affirmation has for its mode of operation that of ascertaining, proving, sifting, confirming, determining, enlightening, and organizing. Negation is not simply intolerant, it is *intolerance in se*, as we see in Protestantism, whose *raison d'être* is to *spite* the Faith, not to affirm it. The only check which its spiteful nature abides, is that which it cannot help. Affirmation, on the contrary, is not simply benevolent. It is one with benevolence itself, but, *per accidens*, it is unswervingly and eternally intolerant of its contrary, and of all that its contrary works by. The two, Affirmation and Negation, stand against each other as Health and Disease. Whatever is said of one pair of contraries may be said of the other pair. As the art of lying is the art of advancing Negation, so the art of Truth is that of advancing Affirmation in all its dimensions. The soldier of Truth is therefore the soldier of Affirmation. And as Negation, like disease, misses no opening for worming or forcing its way to annihilate the affirmative and certain; so the soldiers of Truth or Affirmation should miss no opportunity of getting an advantage against the agencies of Negation to help in expelling it from the borders of creation.

ii. *Carried on with a courageous scrutiny of the pretences assumed by the Negationist.*

But, for the edifying work of promoting the interest of Affirmation, there is required in its competent servants a courageous determination to pierce through these hollow

semblances of Truth, which the Negationist has been quietly allowed to assume for himself, in order to recommend his empty objects as having some positive value.

It is with this view that he always employs positive-sounding terms to cover bald negations, by using good words for bad things, as well as bad words for good things.

Thus an unbeliever in Christianity chooses to distinguish himself from the Christian, not by describing himself truly as an 'infidel,' but under the more decent title proper for those who believe in God—which is 'Deist.' This, therefore, is the title he assumes. Hence it is, that the name of a believer in God, or Deist, has now become a distinguishing name for infidel, with the assent of Christians. 'For,' says the Christian defender, 'Why should you disturb yourself about the infidels taking the name of Deist, or believer in God. It is of no importance. Deist is only a word. We all know what it means.'

So the spoliator of proprietors clothes himself in the attractive appearance of zeal for 'the poor and working classes.' This is assumed by him without question asked by the friend of order; who will tell you, 'It is of no consequence, "friend of poor and working classes" is only a phrase. Lying phrases can do no harm.'

Then the Atheist, generally posing before the world as a zealous promoter of 'science,' calls himself by the name of 'secularist,' *i.e.*, one who belongs to the present age of the world. The honour of being connected with the present age of the world is thus reserved only for Atheists—those who disbelieve in a future state. 'But what does that signify?' says the Christian complacently; 'secularist is only a word. The Atheist is perfectly

welcome, for our part, to take it all to himself if he pleases.'

The same reforming class, when intent on banishing religion from education, advocates its banishment in the sacred name of 'conscience;' the credit of which has now, by force of unchallenged custom, become a special privilege for enemies of religion. 'But where's the harm of that?' thinks the Christian defender. 'Their taking exclusively to themselves the credit of 'conscience' breaks no bones in us. Conscience is only a creditable word.'

The miscellaneous party, of which these characters and the like are ingredients, always take care to proclaim themselves as the 'harbingers of a *bright future*.' Which is to consist either in no redemption, 'no future state,' or in no right of property, no religion, no God, no Christ. The work of bringing on this 'bright future' is thus to be the special charge of infidels, reformers, despoilers of every sort. 'But where is the harm of their assuming all these grand things to themselves,' says the easy-minded Conservative. 'We are not going to alarm ourselves simply because a set of men choose to spread lies about the world. Lies are only words. They break no bones.'

To these assumed positive titles, in which the agents of Privation know how to disguise their aims, we may add further the grandiose recommendations of their hollowness, consisting in eloquent language having the air of philanthropy, nobleness, high principle, conscientiousness, tenderness for the poor 'working classes.'

Devoid as these pretences are of all substance, they nevertheless have a soul-subduing influence, which gives to them, when left to take their place unchallenged in



customary language, a success, which is beyond all computation, for engaging most of the world in favour of the falsehoods they are used to cover, if not *actively*, at least in *quiet submission* to them. The sure conquest that well-dressed lies have, naturally follows from the credulous character that marks most men; of whom only a few think of challenging the validity of the exterior professions, by which their assent is solicited.

This uninquiring temper of mind naturally yields an unchecked advantage to the seductive arts of prostituted language, which the trustees of Truth have allowed the Negationist hypocrites to adopt for the purpose of recommending their privation as plenty, and their evil as good.

Hackneyed as these showy tricks of language are, they hardly ever fail, through the tame acquiescence of Christians, to win from the gullible multitude, male and female, a favourable hearing for the parties employing them;—Negationists of every class, as Atheists, Infidels, Sectarians and Politicians, Conservative and Liberal, who have made their way in society by the art of painting evil as good and good as evil. Hence arises the necessity for the Truth-defender, if he be sincere, of learning how to detect the showy artifices of language, so as to be able in some slight degree to counteract the immense influence for evil, which the employers of them have obtained for themselves. These, in the strength of their popularity which specious lying has gained for everything unworthy, have been able to win for themselves the most honourable places of influence in human society, through the weakness of the trustees of Truth; who have supinely allowed the pretenders to take for themselves, along with the creditable titles of Truth, all the incalculable advantages,

which the credit should bring in its rear, the highest positions in the walks of literature, politics, and science. All these positions, which are rightfully departments in the territory of the Positive, have passed away into the possession of the Negationist enemy, as entirely as Catholic Westminster Abbey has passed into the grasp of the anti-Catholic Establishment. And the obtainers of these stolen positions, clothed in the prestige of philanthropy, education, civilization, etc., enjoy in them the most commanding position in society for holding the mind of the world captive to the reign of ghastly emptiness.

When, then, this has obtained such a firm possession for evil by virtue of flourishing perseveringly the exterior semblance of Truth, the only possible chance of shaking, or of making any impression in the slightest degree in its reign, is by the courageous exposure of the plausible artifices, by which it has been maintained; and these are, the use of good words for bad things, and of bad words for good things. It is the exposure of this prostitution of language for evil purposes, which ought to hold, as it has not yet, the *highest place* in the business of those, who would seek, in opposition to the mischievous Negationist, to promote the Divine interest of Affirmation.

The knight of Truth is therefore bound by the condition of his office as defender, to probe with searching insight the specious semblances of Truth, under cover of which the agencies of evil have won their advantage.

iii. *In which he must aim, after our Lord's example, at Overcoming, instead of merely Evading the arts of the enemy.*

But in applying his detective skill against the arts of Negation, he, as Affirmativist or Positivist, must not be content with any lesser aim than that of over-

*coming*, after the example of the Leader of all workers in the interest of the Positive—our Lord Himself, Who, when the Jewish gainsayers beset Him with their captious questions, was not content merely to save His threatened Truth from imminent defeat by an evasion, but aimed at winning for it an unconditional ascendancy. This intolerance in Him sprung from the same principle as that, which made Him tolerate all hostility that was levelled against His own individual life. And that one principle was unswerving constancy in affirming the rights of God against sin, in the two opposite presentments it offered to Him—that of rendering Him debtor to God for offences, and the other in its attempts to entrap Him into a consent with it. These two operations often required from Him as faithful to God's honour in resisting them, two opposite modes of facing it: the one *lamblike*, in suffering justly for the offence for which He had made Himself responsible; the other *lionlike*, in combating against it. But these opposite moods, the *active* as well as the *passive*, were determined in Him out of the same spirit of fidelity to the honour of God, in labouring against his enemy, sin. For this duty required, on one side, from Him as Sponsor for man, a resistance to sin in the evil consequences it had already succeeded in working upon mankind, by paying the due penalty for the dishonour, which mankind, whom He represented, had through it inflicted upon God. This He did, by accepting patiently all injuries levelled against His own individual state—even to death. This atonement completed the *passive* part of His sacrifice of praise in affirming the rights of God offended.

The same right of God required from Him, on the other hand—as faithfully standing for God's Truth—



the more *active* form of resistance to sin—by uncompromising intolerance of it, when presenting itself in malicious attempts of hypocrites and gainsayers. On these occasions He was ever ready in defence of the assailed Truth, to come forth to combat unsparingly in vindication of it against all dishonouring touch. And this He carried out, even to the overthrow of the aggressors. These had often, on meeting Him, to skulk away before the force of His withering invective. How different was His manner of righteous indignation, from that creeping consent to accept all insulting contradiction, according to the policy of conciliating enemies. Compromise of the Truth entrusted to Him was never found in Him. He sought no other means of conciliating enemies than that, which aims at humbling them.

No other should be the policy of His followers, little or great, private or public. They must always strive at *overcoming*. Though the ascendancy they would have, will never be obtained, what they have to strive for is nothing less than ascendancy. Trying merely to screen one's self from the enemy by buying him off with a sacrifice of part of the Truth, will not serve even to save the cause for the moment. For if temporary safety alone, through compromise, or conciliation, is meditated, without seeking to overcome, the main cause is left still in the enemies' hands, more even than before. And when the enemy holds the mastery, escape is impossible. There is nothing, therefore, but self-betraying weakness in being content simply with preserving oneself on a pinching occasion, or serving the time. To overcome is the only prudent aim, which, whether it is to be successful or not, is the only one ever worth while attempting. And to fail in the attempt to overcome, even many times

or even always, has more safety in it than to succeed in making an escape.

iv. *By Intellectual Skill, applied not only to enlighten the well-disposed, but to confound the enemy.*

And this attempt should be made by the use of the *legitimate* weapons of Truth—and Truth itself, armed in its own native power for maintaining itself in the world. For earthly honour is the product of only two things, the contraries of each other: one is *falsehood*, arrayed in the likeness of Truth; the other is Truth itself in its own likeness. These alone can reign, because these alone operate in that faculty, which is the mainspring of all power amongst men—the mind; where falsehood acts by the seeming light of mock ideas, like those of Victor Hugo and Rénan. Truth acts by the light of *real* ideas, like those of positive science and of scholastic philosophy. Whatever, therefore, proves the power of impudent falsehood amongst men, shows the power of courageous affirmation of Truth. Because Truth alone supplies to falsehood the winning guise proper to affirmation, by which it can lead the mind.

If, then, we see what an enormous power falsehood wields, simply because it is equipped in Truth-like appearances, the same argument only proves how unlimited a power Truth itself would find in the world, if its trustees were always to present it in its own commanding shape, by bravely affirming its honour in their public testimony to it. It is this practical power of boldly-avowed Truth and boldly-denounced falsehood—not worldly-wise prudence or conciliation and gentlemanly fellowship with wickedness—in which the Truth-defender must trust for his means of opposing the power of falsehood in the minds of men.

But, in order that the Truth, which we rely on for its own guardianship, may be efficient against its enemies, it must be employed in the spirit, in which our Lord used it, when in congress with His enemies. And that is—not as to *friends*, for teaching or persuading—but as a weapon to *confound* them. For the character of His enemies did not admit of a friendly proffer to them of the Truth, set in a calm, constructive way. This manner is only for studious disciples. Nor either were they fit for such measured dialectic method, as would be represented in the alternate moves of players in a game of chess or in a Platonic dialogue, where there are acknowledged rules and a security of their being observed fairly on both sides. This is only for fair disputants. But our Lord's enemies were neither disciples nor fair disputants. They were cavillers, and He therefore did not answer their questions as He did for His disciples, or even as much as He did to the timidly inquiring Nicodemus. To His insidious foes He presented Truth in a posture apt only to confound—not to teach, or to teach only in confounding, by words sent from the mouth as stones from a sling—not as a gift from the hand. A like need of combative skill remains as the inheritance of all our Lord's followers; to whom betides the duty of encountering the enemies of His Truth now. The only attitude, which Truth-loving reason has accommodated to the needs of unprincipled adversaries, is that, in which it seeks first of all to humiliate them with its teaching stroke—not the impossible task of instructing them in friendly conference.

v. *From a Standpoint of Independence.*

But, in order to give the confounding power of Truth its proper purchase, its stroke must be delivered, not *under*



*leave* of the enemy, but from an independent standpoint of equality, according to the requisite condition of logical equity—very different from the abject position, which modern Catholic trustees of Truth have so often been content to take up; not neutral ground, but inside the jurisdiction of their own insolent enemies, who would bind them to frame their arguments within such lines and such conditions as they themselves choose to fix. Thus, in reply to a wild and flippant challenge made by some infidel to demonstrate to him the inspiration of Scripture, the innocent Christian champion will take the whole responsibility of answering for the claims of Scripture upon himself. His engagement is therefore like a game undertaken by a player, who should venture all the stakes himself, without requiring any stake from his opponent; and after that deposit his stakes into his own opponent's hand. If, after these preliminaries, he should then, at his opponent's bidding, commence the work of winning the game from his opponent without pieces, or without power to make his own moves, the policy he would be showing would not be a bit more stupid, or self-selling than that shown by our generous Catholic controversialist, who would take upon himself the whole risk of establishing the honour of scriptural inspiration, without requiring the challenger of it to undertake any like risk himself in his impugning it. After charging himself with the burden of proof, he makes the impugner himself the umpire of the whole contest. On such terms it is that he sets about the work of winning from him a favourable verdict for scriptural inspiration; and that must be done by a pleading in which he must, by virtue of his very contract with him, make use of no argument which is taken from grounds

not allowed by the challenger himself, who allows none.

How stands, then, the honour of the inspiration of Scripture staked in the hands of the scoffing infidel? It stands simply as a culprit before a judge in a court, not neutral, but that of the infidel himself, or at the best as a witness fixed in a box before a cross-examiner. The better and the more theological his arguments shall be, the more certainly will they bring upon the cause they support, the return of ridicule, dishonour, and further contempt. And most deservedly so. For this is only the legitimate consequence of his imprudent neglect of logical equity: of which the first thing before all entrance upon argument, is to know *on what terms you stand with your adversary*. This has been entirely omitted by our supposed Truth-defender: who, without any care about equal terms, has allowed the intruding challenger to set the question for discussion—to put him just where he pleases on his own ground—to demand whatever he pleases—to put away all arguments and evidence just as suits him.

In submitting to all this, the Truth-defender allows his adversary to make a fool of him. He has acknowledged his right to dictate to him what he may fight about—the place within his lines where he is to fight—as well as the arms, which he may use in fighting.

Such a sort of standpoint is not that of equality, but of *subjection*. It is, therefore, not the one, from which any wholesome shafts of Truth can be sent forth by the Truth-defender for bringing his adversary to reason.

The standing ground, which the real skilful defender will take, is not like that of a charmed rabbit before a snake—but one selected after our Lord's own fashion.

In confounding His cavilling adversaries, He did not allow them to hold Him in their string, or to set to Him the terms, in which He should give them their answer. He would not let Himself be forced to give a categorical answer 'Yes,' or 'No,' or 'So it is.' On the contrary; standing outside their lines and terms of dialectic, He entirely ignored their right of questioning Him aggressively. This is the reason why we find Him so frequently leaving their questions without any direct answer, but rather turning the questions upon the questioners themselves, with a reproof and vituperation: as when they tried to trip Him up by a see-saw set between duty to God and duty to Cæsar, concealed in the question whether it was 'lawful to give tribute to Cæsar or not.' There was a question, which would have been said, according to our approved fashion of talking nowadays, to 'deserve at least a polite answer rendering the precise information required. Because, however much the Pharisees might be opponents, the opponents were at least gentlemen.' Our Lord treated their question as deserving of neither. Because it was put in hypocrisy, as He knew. Instead, therefore, of submitting to be held in His reply within the tether of their terms, He at once shook Himself free of their usurped logical jurisdiction, and took for Himself, without asking their leave, the standing of independence which logical equity gave Him, saying, 'Why tempt ye me, ye hypocrites? Show me a penny.' In seizing their question at once by its head, in its malicious motive, as a personal offence to Himself, a teacher of the Truth—not as an inquiry after Truth, He baulked them from advancing a step beyond their first question: so that all further discussion under their own lead was at once rendered impossible to them,



and they felt confounded by His reply. And the reply took its confounding force from this: that, instead of being offered *apologetically* and conciliation-wise, it was sent by Him from a standing-ground suitable for meeting His hypocritical cavillers—that of an equal right with them to take a lead in the discussion. It was this purchase of a *free-standing*, that gave to His reply the effect of thrusting them back into a fit state of confusion for receiving afterwards a drenching shower of satisfaction thrown at their first question in the answer, ‘Render unto Cæsar the things of Cæsar, and to God the things of God.’

The fashion set by Him, is the one, which all defenders of His Truth, should take as a lesson, in choosing their standpoint against the unbelievers, heretics and infidels of our own day, who now succeed to the place of the Jewish prevaricators. If we want to send any shaft which may profit them, those who undertake it must stand by themselves on their own grounds, clear and separate from all complicity with the enemy, where they can at once, previous to all debates, refuse him his assumed right of setting the question to be asked, or the terms on what it is to be debated.

### 3, IN THE SPIRIT OF COMPLETE DISENGAGEMENT FROM THE ENEMY’S TOILS, THE TRUTH-DEFENDER SHOULD —AFTER OUR LORD’S EXAMPLE OF ACTIVE-RESISTANCE—

i. *Set at nought the Enemy’s usurped pretences of Loyalty, Science, Scripture, etc.*

In this spirit of perfect disengagement from the enemy’s authority as to right of standing on the territory of Truth, or of using its instrument of language, let the independent Truth-affirmer, as a soldier of counter-revolution, set at nought the titles, which the enemy

impudently usurps to himself as champion of liberty, science, loyalty, and Scripture, etc.

These pretensions should receive from him the same treatment, as that which our Lord Himself showed to those of His Pharisaic adversaries, who presumed to confront Him, as if they were the representatives of Moses and the Prophets, and of Cæsar, taking to task one who was a rebel against all of them.

Such assumed superiority of title was never for a moment tolerated by Him. He refused to see in those hypocrites better representatives of the Law and the Prophets and Cæsar than He was Himself. On the contrary, He affirmed against the pretenders His own rightful position as fulfiller of the Law and Prophets, in which they professed to believe; He sent them back to learn of those very authorities of which they professed to be to Him the exponents; referring them, as an *argumentum ad hominem*, to the Scriptures they pretended to think so much of; where they would learn, that He Himself was the one spoken of, and they themselves the nullifiers of their sense. For this reason He Himself, as the rightful representative of Scripture teaching, urged against them its own vituperating words, 'Ye hypocrites, well did Isaias prophecy of you, saying, "This people draw nigh to Me with their mouths, and honour Me with their lips. But their heart is far from Me. In vain do they worship Me, teaching for doctrines the commandments of men."' Such was the re-acting spirit, in which He met the enemies of His Truth. However gentle and unreservedly communicative of Truth He was to docile ignorance, He never would allow His honour as the fulfiller of the Law and Prophets, to pass into the hands of the presumptuous cavillers, who only sought to undo

their fulfilment under pretence of seeking for fair discussion about them. And the like sort of unyielding treatment should be shown to those, who, whether designedly, or as inert mediums of a false tradition, are busy only in overthrowing the interests, of which they profess themselves to be the special patrons. As when they march against the friends of Truth, order, and religion in the sounding names of loyalty to Cæsar, or as champions of Liberty, Scripture, and Science. The cant of these empty braggarts of Negation should prompt the watchman of Truth in the interest of well-ordered reason to treat their puffy pretensions with rebuke, with mockery and disdain, and, as its trusty exponents, to turn against them the edge of the very authority, of which they falsely profess to be the upholders.

ii. *Undertake no burden of Proof not required by Logical Equity.*

The next point in dialectic economy, which the Truth-defender must, on pain of losing all his position, observe, is not to suffer himself to be let in to the simpleton's task of undertaking on the enemies' terms, the *onus probandi* of any of the truth he holds (as the truth of miracles) at the bidding of the adversaries : which would imply that they were his rightfully-judging accusers, and he the rightfully accused.

Such a step would be a weak-minded acknowledgment of the adversary's jurisdiction over him, which the simple friends of the Truth have but too frequently made, out of their mistaken idea that the insulting challenge to prove their doctrines was a good opportunity for their attempting to satisfy an honest desire to be convinced of the Truth. Impelled by this fond persuasion, the zealous maintainer of miracles commits himself to an idle waste



of well-constructed reasons upon those, who only wanted to harass him by demanding them of him. The attempt ends simply, as it naturally might, in the bitterness of disappointed confidence, and the further profanation of the honour of the Truth, which he essayed to justify.

The acknowledgment of the adversary's jurisdiction over himself, which it practically is, is the least of the damage resulting from hastily undertaking to render satisfactory proof of one's belief when assailed. In reverse of which, the method, which logical economy would dictate, should be that of our Lord Himself: Who, when the Pharisaical party of Negation demanded of Him 'a sign,' refused, knowing that they were not seeking a sign for a guide into Truth, but as an insolent challenge to Him, who had given signs already. For which reason He declared that 'No sign' should be given, save one; which they would laugh to scorn—the sign of Jonas the prophet, in His resurrection. So, too, when after having flogged the money-changers out of the Temple, and cursed the barren fig-tree, the enemies of His truth demanded 'by what authority he did these things;' He refused to tell them, upon the strict grounds of logical equity, as having no less a right in the territory of Truth than they. Standing stiffly upon this ground, He gave them to understand, that He would not tell them His authority, unless they could first tell Him, as indeed they were bound to do, whether they did or did not, acknowledge the baptism of John. And as they could not give an honest reply to that preliminary question, He said, 'neither will I tell you by what authority I do these things.' Instead of that He treated them to two parables, in which they found themselves denounced as less likely to go into Heaven than the publicans and harlots; and

then as a set of robbers and murderers of 'the Lord of the vineyard,' and as liable to be ground to powder for coming under the crushing fall of the 'stone of the corner.' This only shows how sternly our Lord, the model soldier of Affirmation, guarded all His rights in logical equity from any disrespectful touch, by refusing, on principle, to offer proof when demanded, otherwise than in good faith, for the purpose of learning the truth as children.

This wise behaviour is the example for His disciples, now, in Truth guarding, never to allow their zeal for justifying their Truth to beguile them into a surrender of their own ground in logical equity, by undertaking a costly expenditure of their best treasures of reason upon captious adversaries, who only put forth their demands for proof as a way of boasting, that the demands cannot be satisfied.

iii. *Demand from the Assailants proofs of his own right to attack.*

Instead of that, they should rather use the right, which dialectic equity gives to the party assailed on his own territory, of making counter-demands upon the assailant, as to the authority he has assumed. This rule of common law—and common sense—is generally omitted, or but feebly and ineffectually followed by the Truth-holder in his submissive style of dialectic. But in neglecting to require satisfaction from his adversary to show his right of calling him to account, he not only tacitly admits that the adversary has a righteous claim to demand from him an account of his belief, but admits along with it, that he himself has *no equal right* to ask satisfaction for being invaded on his own territory.

This logical iniquity consisting of a transposition of

the merits of right and wrong, is a feature, which we see present throughout the whole controversy between the insolent agents of Negation and the craven trustees of Truth.

Here again for our guidance we can get some help from the before-cited example of our Lord Himself, when He turned upon His cavilling besiegers counter-questions, by which He would bring them to a sense of their emptiness, saying, 'I also would ask you a question. The baptism of John, whence was it? From Heaven or from men?' And again, with the view of confounding them, 'What think ye of Christ? whose Son is He?' And when they said 'of David,' He turns upon them with the question 'How, then, does David in spirit call Him Lord.' 'How is He then His son?' How efficacious the use of His logical right of demanding was, we see from its result, that 'from that day forth they durst not ask Him any questions.'

These and many other instances of self-assertion and self-respect only show how unexceptionally jealous our Lord always was, that His dialectic right should not suffer any diminution in His hands. His example might encourage the Truth-holder of the present day in a firm determination not to forego the use of the inexhaustible right, which his affirmative position gives him, of putting questions to those, who are arrogant invaders of the positive territory of Truth, of which he himself is a free citizen.

iv. *Not allow the Adversary to draw him away from his proper basis of Argument.*

Another caution, which the care for logical equity will dictate to the Truth-guarder, is not to allow the adversary to draw him from his own standpoint in argument, to



some false ground of his own, upon which he would like him to stake the issue of his cause. Which is sure to be attempted. As, for instance, when the French infidels would try to make the Christian people rest the whole right to associations as Religious Orders and congregations upon a decision of the fictitious question, whether they had been authorised by the State or not. This is a surreptitious way of getting in underhand the recognition of an antecedent, or underlying mock-principle, viz., that *State Authority* is the foundation of men's rights to associate as a congregation. Which it is not, never was, or could be. The right of association for religious purposes, or for charity, or for trade, is the legitimate growth of natural freedom inherent in the members of society; which the State is, of its own duty, bound to *recognise* and protect, not to put down, or treat as something to be restrained.

If the State, therefore, arrogates to itself a claim to be the fountain, of a right in men, which belongs to man as man, and to Christian as Christian, it is guilty of an invasion of their natural liberty, instead of being, as it is bound to be, the protector of it.

And this false claim is what the French Atheistic tyrants are now straining hard to compel the Christian congregations to acknowledge in their practice.

And if the congregations should weakly allow themselves to make such an acknowledgment, they would be forsaking the invincible position they possess upon the ground of natural inalienable right, and letting themselves fall into the trap of a false anti-principle, which their atheistic enemies had prepared for them.

Nothing can, therefore, be more vital for anyone's safety than to take care to have the setting of his position on his own ground, and not to allow the enemy—such

as the French State—to put him just where it pleases, so as to hold him captive within the grasp of a false postulate of their own.

v. *Make a Sceptical Examination of the Adversary's phraseology, which is always fraudulent.*

Another point which militant economy requires of the defender for keeping any hold upon his territory of Truth, is to keep a sceptical watch over all the enemy's use of *phraseology*. Embodying, as it does, the organic structure of Truth, language, when perverted, is the most subtle instrument that the power of falsehood uses for maintaining its dominion in the minds of men, as it does in all the verbal shapes, in which it casts questions for discussion, and the *modes of discussing them*, as was partly described in the last chapter. This misleading action comes from the convertible, or, rather, pervertible, nature of language itself; which may be made the instrument of either of *two* very contrary things—one of cant for demoralizing, and the other of proper diction for enlightening. This two-handed character makes language the real weapon, with which the battle of Truth and anti-truth must be fought, if it is ever to be fought at all. Whoever has the direction of its phrases, whether for cant and slang, or for honest rhetoric, has so much victory in his own hand over the pliable minds of men. The amount of mastery, or of depression in either will vary according to the varying prevalence in public of the two opposite applications of rhetoric, whether as honouring Truth in its watchwords, or as honouring falsehood in cant and slang. It is in this service, as an instrument of cant, for transposing the titles of right and wrong, that our English language is now universally abused, in all its denoting powers, to an extent beyond the

power of more than imperfectly estimating. Steaming forth day by day incessantly in volumes, like effluvia from an open drain, from the minds of our press-writing men, corrupted in all their thinking by a debasing materialism, it spreads its enveloping influence over the understandings of its recipients, as closely as the drain-sent vapour clasps the body of the breathing man. And as the foully-laden atmosphere shows its baneful power in engendering disease, or else in lowering the bodily health down to a temper compatible with its impure self; so the constant action of the prostituted medium of English thought, impregnated with the spirit of lies, reduces the unsuspecting understandings of those, who mentally inhale it, to a habit accommodated to its own demoralizing strain. And that habit is one, in which all the native principles of human reason are subverted. If example of this were wanted, only look for a moment how in the modern English mind the wholesome idea of vital *form*, as contrasted with brute matter, is absent from every thought that wins its way into speech, except when it is wanted for lending to something worthy a contemptible imputation; while the only things that are allowed to have any honour as essential or determining, must be those, which have the servile character of tangible matter—dregs, inert dregs—the dregs of organisms in nature for causes of life; the dregs of society for the sources of sovereign power and decisive wisdom in politics; the dregs of the people for authority, to be appealed to in religious government; the dregs of doctrine for spiritual food in religious teaching; the dregs of knowledge for mental culture in education. These are the stuff that modern English thought upholds for the leading principles of all its things, its economy, its



politics, its philosophy, and its religion. All might be briefly summed up together in one formula 'the human worship of dregs.' It is dregs accordingly, to which the present administration of the English language gives its best places of honour, while the terms which it possesses for signifying baseness are unfailingly transferred to whatever is life giving, essential, and abiding, as the words *form* and *principle*. It is for this reason, that such a contemptuous employment is allotted in English to every word and adjective, denoting a noble and spiritual, or intellectual nature, as the word 'idea,' which no Englishman will condescend to fight for; 'abstract,' 'metaphysical,' 'philosophical,' 'theological,' 'Truth,' 'justice,' and 'principle' and 'abstract right,' 'contemplation and theory.' These words, descriptive of the nobler element of human nature, we find entering our ordinary English speech usually with the contemptuous word, 'mere' or 'merely' stuck before them as '*merely* abstract,' '*mere* theory;' serving only as slang, to stamp a damaging character upon whatever things it may be wanted to pelt with ignominious imputations. Only as reproachful epithets, it is, that our modern usage of English admits the naming for those noble characters, by which intellectual man is distinguished from the brute creation. This preposterous elevation of the servile, degradation of the noble is only one dominant feature amongst others in the ordinary administration of the English language. Which, as a vehicle of mental productions, serves chiefly to provide the envious heart with a debasing rhetorical exercise for turning upside down and downside up our natural conceptions of noble and servile, select and common, rare-gifted height and vulgar breadth, worthy and unworthy, free mind, and passive matter.

It is this prostitution of the faculties of language in the service of perversion, that makes it needful on the part of the Truth-holders to exercise a constant habit of suspicion upon its employment. The organic structure of falsehood, indispensable as the knowledge of it is, seems to have been almost entirely neglected by them, particularly in respect of watchwords, pregnant phrases, antitheses and axioms, assertions obliquely made, or tacit assumptions. They have, as a rule, taken any words, such as the cheating word 'denominational,' that the enemy might choose to coin for his convenience, and have used them in the same mode, as he has that one, for smothering any right of the Church, as distinguished from the rights of the heretical products of private will and private judgment.

In the same way we find a free unchallenged admission given by the weak-wristed Truth-holder to other expressions, which have a like obliterating, or deliquescent force with 'denominational,' such as those enumerated in the last chapter, 'creeds' for 'non-creeds,' 'beliefs' for 'non-beliefs,' 'religions' for 'non-religions,' and shapes of infidelity, 'sectarian' for 'non-sectarian,' and 'unsectarian' for 'ultrasectarian.' Not the slightest inquiry is ever made, that I can see, into the use of the word *forms* for *deforms*, and positive titles to dignify defects, and 'conscience' for renunciation of the obligations of *conscience*. The innocent looking and indifferent particles 'or,' 'rather than,' 'but not,' etc., never excite suspicion, though they are implements of more disintegration than can be computed. All smothering expressions, and crippling terms of speech seem to obtain unchallenged admission with the unsuspecting Trustees of Truth—to their own complete stultification.

In taking into their ears untested these perversions of

language, they are steadily doing the devil's work, by learning to demoralize their understandings in the devil's own drill, which the perverted use of language is. Suppose, for instance, the mind accept the phrase 'Protestant Faith,' it puts the denial of Catholic Faith on equal footing of dignity with the faith itself. And this makes the choice between the two as if it were a choice between two religions, not between religion and its rejection. The logical consequence, which is always practically realized, of this, is at least allowing the faith to have no more right in the world than the denial of it.

Take the beforementioned instance of 'conscience,' used, as it is, hypocritically in the anti-conscience clause, for excluding the rights of conscience by a renunciation of conscientious obligations. Just consider the consequence of acquiescing in the phrase. For, notwithstanding the common glib assertion, that we may trust to people's inconsistency, on the plea that they are not so bad in practice as they are in their principle, consequences are always carried out most logically sooner or later, and the consequence of acquiescing in the false use of 'conscience' is this: that we seal with our consent every anti-law and destituting decree, by which the enemies, under the advantage of the inversion, have endeavoured to extirpate religion from education, and to put down its teachers. There is, in fact, no impiety or profanation that we have any right to complain of when we have once given our sanction by silence, still more by *adoption*, to the rule that 'conscience' and what goes along with it, 'religious liberty,' shall be deemed to stand, as it has in England, a valid pretext for sacrificing the conscience of man or Christian to the claims of heretical Negation.

Or, take the instance of the same word 'conscience' as



allowed to be pleaded for a refusal to acknowledge in the Parliamentary Oath the existence of God, while we have nothing of the 'rights of conscience' alleged for those, who do not like to hear the Name of God dishonoured and publicly profaned.

What has been said here of 'conscience' and 'religious liberty' is true of all the rest of human language, from which public sin takes its terms of rhetoric, and notably of law, which in the mouths of the tyrannical always stands for violation of law, and of 'institution' for de-institution. Those who allow their ears and minds to take in its words in their subverting application are helping to demoralize their understanding, to put out its light, and to implant darkness. They are contentedly putting on the yoke of their usurping enemy, donning his uniform, and subjecting themselves to work in his cause. They have not only become his in *principle* by acknowledging his authority, but they have become one with him in habitual service. And, instead of helping to the counter-revolution, like real combatants, they are, like Conservatives, effectively giving all their weight to the revolution which they profess to hate. Prudent economy will therefore dictate to the Truth-defender the necessity of being extremely sceptical in accepting any phraseology of the day from the parties of the world. Let him know well, and become more and more convinced, that in taking any word, substantive, or adjective, or even in-offensive-sounding particle, or terms of speech as employed by them, he is really playing with verbal dice, loaded against himself with lying assumptions quietly inserted—*petitiones principii*—and consequences stolen from him in advance. Knowing this, his duty plainly is to disengage himself entirely from the *whole system* of

language as administered in the camp of English literature, with all its lying traditions, whether as to fact, or sentiment, in history, politics, and religion. It should, without any distinction or exception, be thrown from him bodily as something, which has been so prostituted in the service of lying, as to be more than presumptively unfit for the purposes of Truth, until it shall have first undergone in his own eclectic hands a reformation to a healthier habit.

For this reason he should renounce it all, and declare his independence of it as at present used, beginning within the province of his own mind. His renunciation of it should be as clear, as if it were the continuation of that first renunciation of the sinful world he renounced in baptism, with all the devil's pomps, and vanities, of which, indeed, modern English rhetorical phraseology forms an enormous portion. After having liberated himself from captivity under it, the next step is, that, in which he should try to rescue the language itself from its polluting captivity. This will consist in his taking it into his own grip, as an instrument restored to its native use, free from all the lying English traditions, which it has hitherto served to embody, honour, and adorn. Nor will he give it the authority of his own example by using it, until after it has undergone an unsparing purification in the crucible of a testing process applied to its words and modes of speech under questions like these: What does the word or phrase mean? Anything, or nothing? If so, what? Is the application a partial sense for the whole one, as of a penny for a shilling? Is it a bit for the entirety, or a mere material part for a vital element? Is it the *thing itself* that is meant, or the direct *contrary* of the thing? like 'conscience,' as English for repudiation

of conscience, and 'religious liberty' as English for crushing religious liberty. Is it a lying word to dignify a defect, or deform under the name of a 'form,' or of a positive guise like 'Unitarian,' to dignify the extinction of the belief in the Holy Trinity.

The same scrutiny should be rigorously applied to all mendacious *combinations* and terms of speech, contrasts, antagonisms and see-saws, operated, as we have seen, so cunningly under the particles 'or,' 'rather than,' 'but not,' and even the definitive word 'the.' To counteract the effect that comes by this abuse of words, it would be advisable, even at the risk of sounding new and strange, to have truthful expressions coined to take the place of the lying ones: so that the things to which we have been in the habit of according the credit of 'principles,' 'theories,' 'philosophy,' 'science,' would be denominated 'non-principles,' anti-philosophy, anti-doctrines, anti-theory, and anti-science. If the same reformed measure were dealt out to political parties 'Tyrannicals' would be the name used for the people who have dubbed themselves 'Liberals;' and 'Sub-tyrannicals,' the description for the vast medley of helpless mortals, who have got themselves called Conservatives, for never conserving anything out of the hands of the Tyrannicals. This caution would greatly help the Truth-defender to make himself independent and free both in spirit and profession, from the all-embracing net of perverting language, by which the Negation-master holds the minds of men under his sway.

vi. *Enter aggressively the territory of lying Negation by—*

(a) *Pressing upon its agents the responsibility of the Position they have Assumed in their contradictions.—*



Trusting in his weapon of a purified language the Truth-defender, in the true spirit of counter-revolution must proceed further in his revolt against the forces of Negation, to the reactionary step of turning to *invade their territory*.

This is to be done by pressing upon the enemy, in whatever department of Negation he may be engaged, as politics, or science, or history, the responsibility of all the absurdities, lies, and other wickedness, which the position he has assumed involves. These absurdities are to be met by reason : but, mind, not reason calmly arguing as with friends, or calmly expostulating as with companions, or laboriously refuting as with scholars. Such a work of reason is all unfit for the occasion, and would bring down more than the previous weight of contemptuous insolence upon the reasoner. The attitude of reason for meeting an adversary, with whom there is no common ground, must be that fit for cavillers, *i.e.*, of reason impugning, reason accusing and denouncing, reason satirising, reason laughing, reason mocking and caricaturing. These are the only moods that reason has, proportioned to the ordinary action assumed by pompous emptiness. And this economy, without ever quitting the dignity of reason, must be shown first by fixing the enemy fast within the position, which he has dared to assume, on the side of Negation. This will be usually at least the *contradictory*, if not the *contrary*, of the position he opposes, according to a well-known axiom, the ultimate principle of Truth ; that, as of two contradictories, ‘so,’ or ‘not so,’ one must be false and the other true ; there can be no medium between them. If, therefore, he attacks one, he must be deemed to espouse the other, whether he own it or not ; or even if he disown it.

Thus, for example, Mr. Gladstone, in attacking the infallibility of the Pope, as something not to be held by Catholics, but to be expostulated against, assumes, by his very position, that the contradictory of infallibility, which is *fallibility* of the head of the Church, is the tenet that Catholics ought to hold.

(b) *And also of the latent postulates which their contradictions (like those in Mr. Gladstone's Anti-Vaticanism) imply.*—And together with this quasi-dogma of Papal fallibility as the right Catholic belief, he has to be charged with all its obvious consequences, whether he likes it or not, or however he may disclaim them. Now, to maintain that the fallibility of the head of God's Church is the reasonable tenet for Catholics to hold, is to say, that they ought to be convinced that the head of their Church can mislead them, and the whole Church, in his *ex-cathedrâ* pronouncements concerning the Christian faith and morals. This is bad enough.

But the untrustworthiness of the Head of God's Church for guarding the Truth is not the whole burden, for which Mr. Gladstone makes himself responsible. That goes further to the idea, that the Head of the Church *has failed* in guarding the Christian Faith. Because *power* to fail is certain to realize itself in act whenever the liability is put to the test. As a lame man must halt when he puts his walking power to the test; so the fallible Pope must fail, when duly tried. Now the Pope has been tried for 1800 years, and therefore, being fallible, his guidance *must have* failed. To have failed, therefore, is necessarily contained in the liability to failure, ascribed so earnestly by Mr. Gladstone to the Pope as his rightful property. Thus he makes himself chargeable with upholding as a quasi-religious dogma an

opinion, not for Protestants, but for Catholics, that the Head of God's Church can commit them and the whole body of the Church of the faithful to *error*, that he *must* do so, and that he consequently *has* done so. The failure of the guiding Head entails the failure of the guided body, and that irretrievably. For the *ex-cathedrâ pronouncements* are irrefragable. That the Catholic Church, with all who are in it, is in irretrievable error with regard to Christian faith and morals, is what Mr. Gladstone would have Catholics make a precious part of their Christian faith. Next, he goes on to make himself duly chargeable with another endless train of absurdities, by virtue of the law of contradiction. According to this, he has to maintain, that a regular suite of most elegant virtues in Catholics depends upon their having an untrustworthy and actually misleading guidance in the Head of the Church. He makes out, that the idea of safety from error in the Head of God's Church ought to be regarded by Catholics, with whom he expostulates, as a positive evil; being a danger to the people, a menace to states, taking away the subject's responsibility, and, as Renan says expressly, their merit, their virtue, and their capacity for loyalty. These being the evils flowing from the holding the trustworthiness of their Christian Head; just so much amount of impediment to loyalty, virtue, and obedience, etc., is removed from the Catholics by their renouncing the Pope as trustworthy: which of course, therefore, the Catholic ought to do for his own peace of mind. For to be without a chance of being *misled* by the Head of his Church in his religious belief is a condition, according to Mr. Gladstone, positively bad for his soul's health, as being destructive of his virtue, merit, and loyalty. The assurance of having to be *misled*



by him would be consequently a desirable condition, in which the rational Catholic should rejoice. As the grace to lead right is in the Pope a tyranny, the fatality of his being led wrong would be therefore, in the Catholic, a requisite for liberty. In the interest of human liberty, human virtue, and peace of states, the head of God's Church is bound to mislead the Church and its members: and they ought to think it a great blessing to be misled by him. These absurdities with which Mr. Gladstone and his likes recklessly make themselves chargeable, are too evident to need proof. But it is necessary to guard against the slippery trick, by which they would make their escape from these consequences. That escape would be very easy, if you let them use it. It is this. They would say all this is mere logic: it is pushing things to *extremes*. In every charge they make against the Catholic Church, they choose to hold themselves free of all responsibility for the consequences of their position. Either they don't care to think of them, or if they are reminded, they simply give reason the slip by saying, 'We Englishmen have the lordly privilege of being unreasonable without having to be called to account. You must let us violate the light of reason as much as we please, we don't choose to hold ourselves responsible for the evident consequences, however monstrous, of anything that we may say.'

This charter for unlimited recklessness is required as an escape from the next monstrous absurdity in Mr. Gladstone's anti-infallibility position, as the right one for the Catholic. If trustworthy guidance in the head of God's Church is a menace to states, and the civil order; then, of course, the safety of the civil order would have been best provided for by God in giving to his

people a head that will commit the Church and all its members to irretrievable error, in faith and morals. If it should be alleged in excuse, that it is not said that infallibility itself is an evil, but only the *false belief* in it, this would be unsaying the whole charge made by him. Because He makes infallibility itself to be intrinsically an evil—since it would be tantamount to taking away man's *responsibility*, and giving his intellect 'over by power of attorney' to the Pope. There is no loophole here possible for him in distinguishing between *real* infallibility and the *mere persuasion* of its truth. No due sense of responsibility, no virtue, no merit, no loyalty, and in fact, no natural virtue is allowed by Mr. Gladstone to be compatible with the idea, false or true, of having a trustworthy ecclesiastical head. This the Catholic, however, holds, and there is therefore no way of being a good Catholic but by being a bad man, or a good man, except by being a bad Catholic.

The same reasoning of course holds good for every *grade* of trustworthiness. In so far as a leader approaches trustworthiness, in so far does he tend to make his followers disloyal, incapable of virtue, or merit. Hence we learn what would be the requisite property in a church, which Mr. Gladstone could find it in his conscience to patronise. The church he would condescend to belong to, must have for its head one, who is fallible—certain to fail, actually failing—misled and misleading, or, in other words, a church, concerning which it might be opportunely asked, as he had asked, about the Establishment, saying, 'Is it worth preserving?' Such a Church alone would he think it safe to belong to. In a Church not worth preserving, that could not go right, there might flourish loyalty, merit, manliness, and all

the other fine things, of which Mr. Gladstone professes to be the patron. If all these virtues be the fruits of fallibility, and of unlimited wrong-going, it is no wonder if Mr. Gladstone should find himself supremely happy in his religion. For whatever one might decide as being the head of the Establishment he belongs to, whether it be the Queen, or the Archbishop of Canterbury, or the House of Commons, or the will of the people, or Lord Penzance, or all these heads together, or no head at all; no one could deny it the Protestant credit of having lots of the fallibility and untrustworthiness Mr. Gladstone prizes so much, sufficient to satisfy the purest idea of modern statesmanship. Whatever danger there may be in it, it is at least free from that one, which alone Mr. Gladstone holds to be worth pamphleteering against—the danger of ever going right. If we were to pursue the subject to its immediate issues, the absurdities which Mr. Gladstone embraces without heed increase to such a degree, as to make all infallibility, whether of Pope, Church, or of aught else, an evil, oppressive of human liberty. There must be no infallible guidance in anything, not even in *Scripture*, nor even in a *single text of it*. It would have in it the same formal ground that makes the Pope's infallibility so dreadful to the interests of the human race. To save us from the danger of *Scripture's* infallible guidance, the only security is—that no one, who professes to take it as the sole rule of faith ever thinks he need be guided by it at all, more than suits his private taste. This is what has hitherto saved its infallibility in some measures from attack. Else we might have a statesman coming out with an expostulation against believing in the Bible, or in a bit of it, under peril of men losing all their loyalty to the sovereign—



their virtue, and manliness, and of upsetting all governments and states.

From these absurd postulates follow others with equal certainty, which the holders can only try to escape from, by calling obvious consequence and consistency, as they always do, by the name of 'pushing principles to their extremes.' If darkness, uncertainty, liability to mislead and to be misled, are such excellent conditions, as Mr. Gladstone teaches us to conclude they are, for human freedom, for virtuous merit, and for security of states; then it obviously follows, that it is the duty of all men to procure as much of them as possible. There is no extreme in virtue. And as virtue has for its condition all the aforesaid qualities; it would require all the usual Liberal contempt for logic and consistency to get rid of this natural consequence—that it is the duty of men to get all the securities they can, to keep them in uncertainty, wrong-going, blundering, and darkness about their spiritual interest. All this compound nonsense follows Mr. Gladstone's and Renan's professions, as absolutely as 5 follows the addition of 2 and 3. Whether they know it or not, as they are bound to know it, they are responsible for it all, and they and their likes ought to be lashed with the tails of their own consequents, whether they like it or not.

In this form of meeting the aggressor of Infallibility, the aggressor himself is not politely entertained upon the premises he has invaded, of Catholic doctrine, as if he had an undoubted right to stand there, and take the Catholic to task for his believing in a vital article of his own religion. No defence is proffered to him. But repellent as the reply is, to which he is treated, it is, at the same time, pregnant with the virtue of the positive

argument, turned the adverse side out, which, if reduced to a state of still life, would form the parts of a calmly constructed reasoning in support of Papal Infallibility. This, however, if submitted in cold, didactic form to the cowardly aggressor for his unbiassed consideration, would only have the effect of bringing down from him a shower of more profane insolence about the doctrine he was bent upon calumniating.

The same troop of inevitable postulates follow in all the other departments of modern error, as of science, morals, and political philosophy. They all equally contain lurking and manifest fatal lies, self-contradictions, confusions and darkness in all their postulated definitions, their postulated axioms, their postulated disjunctions, and postulated combinations.

The exposure of their postulated falsehoods would be a fruitful source of public service in the cause of Truth, as well as affording splendid sport to the volunteer dialectician, who should enter into the field with his dogs and guns of logical precision.

These are some few rudiments of the modes of Christian warfare with error; which, effective as they may be made, are not difficult. For real contest with it does require entering into the special department of science, in which the error takes its seat. Darwinism, as error, is not a matter of natural science, or of natural history; though natural history is its seat. It consists in the obtrusion of a structureless assertion without any other reasoning, than what is based upon some outrageous allegations, he chooses to call 'facts,' which he asks you throughout to take for granted, viz., that man has no need of a sense of smell, of ears, of wisdom-teeth, or of hair, and of many other things less observed. These are

what he calls his 'facts.' Now for the reasoning. Not being of any good to him, he must have derived these functions and features from some other species of animal, to whom ears and wisdom—teeth, hair, and smelling-power were useful, as an ape: from whom, therefore, we must infer, that his whole race was descended. This unnatural mock-theory is not a mistake, or error of natural science. It requires no natural history to treat it. What is alone needed is the art of exposing brazen-faced impudence, detecting tricks, verbal frauds and fallacies. We can learn these tricks and shifts of the workers of error in the same manner as a fisherman learns the ways of a hooked salmon, or a sportsman the manners of a badger, fox, weasel, or rat. Equally open to observations are the tricks and rhetorical manœuvres and terms of speech for the concealment of structureless conclusions, which error employs for ingratiating itself in the minds of men; and the art of warfare with it consists to a great extent in knowing these tricks, and the way in which they should be met.

If the few methods for doing so, simple and obvious as they are, which I have already sketched in these papers, were perseveringly used by the friends of Truth, there would hardly fail to appear some little difference for the better, in the position, which the timid, retreating Truth-holder now occupies in front of his boasting Negationist enemy; who, it is his whole wisdom to know, is strong only in the force, which the Truth-holder has allowed him to steal from himself.

THE END.



*By the Rev. F. H. LAING, D.D.*

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